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RETHINKING SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION
SYLVIA A. LAW
"t
INTRODUCTION
This Article attempts to articulate a stronger constitutional concept
of sex-based equality than that which currently exists.' The central
thesis is that the development of modern constitutional sex equality
doctrine has suffered from a lack of focus on biological reproductive
differences between men and women. The reality of sex-based physical
differences poses a significant problem for a society committed to ideals
of individual human freedom and equality of opportunity.
To the extent that constitutional doctrine shapes culture and indi-
vidual identity, an equality doctrine that denies the reality of biological
difference in relation to reproduction reflects an idea about personhood
that is inconsistent with people's actual experience of themselves and
the world. The constitutional ideal alienates people from their own ex-
perience. Given our history in which the idea of "man" is the linguistic
and legal equivalent of "person," a concept of equality that denies bio-
logical difference has particularly adverse effects upon women.
The central biological difference between men and women is that
only women have the capacity to create a human being. For many peo-
ple, the decision to bear a child is jointly made by a man and a woman
and is the occasion for joyous commitment to one another, to the child,
and to the future. But it is not always so. Only women can grow a
human being, and, although sperm is also needed, it is easily obtain-
able.2 The power to create people is awesome. Men are profoundly
t Professor of Law, New York University. B.A. 1964, Antioch College; J.D.
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" For an excellent early treatment of the issues addressed here, see'Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 53-59 (1977). For a recent, perceptive discussion of
these issues by a principal architect of contemporary constitutional sex discrimination
doctrine, see Judge Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, William T. Joyner Lecture, Univ. of N.C. School of Law,
Apr. 6, 1984 (forthcoming in N.C.L. Rav. 1984).
2 Women who choose to do so can ordinarily obtain spermu through sexual rela-
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disadvantaged by the reality that only women can produce a human
being and experience the growth of a child in pregnancy. Pregnancy
and childbirth are also burdensome to health, mobility, independence,
and sometimes to life itself, and women are profoundly disadvantaged
in that they alone bear these burdens.' And although men may be dis-
advantaged by their relatively minor role in reproduction, we have con-
structed a society in which men are advantaged, relative to women, in
important material and spiritual ways.
The focus here is exclusively on a relatively narrow point of con-
stitutional sex equality doctrine. I do not deal comprehensively with the
critical equality issues of state action and the public/private split,4 or
with the question when discrimination can be proved by showing that
state policy in fact has discriminatory effects,5 or with the issue of af-
firmative programs to redress the disabilities of past discrimination."
Further, I make no effort to describe an affirmative program to pro-
mote greater sex-based equality.' The judicial enforcement of constitu-
tional norms, even when broadly conceived and applied, is not likely to
produce sex-based equality. Achieving sex-based equality requires so-
cial movement for transformation of the family, child rearing arrange-
ments, the economy, the wage labor market, and human consciousness.
No constitutional principle mandates or allows courts to effectuate the
range of changes needed to allow actual equality between men and
women.8 Nonetheless, constitutional concepts of equality are important
tions. Sperm banks, both formal and informal, are available to women who want a
child but do not want sexual relations. See, e.g., D. HITCHENS, LESBIANS CHOOSING
MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL ISSUES IN DONOR INSEMINATION (1981); Annas, Artificial In-
semination: Beyond the Best Interests of the Donor, 9 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug.
1979, at 14; Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemina-
tion by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 588 (1979); Kritchev-
sky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Ex-
panded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981).
3 Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1579-83 (1979) pro-
vides an excellent summary of the physical burdens of pregnancy.
4 See, e.g., Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
5 But see infra notes 126-80 and accompanying text.
6 But see infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
7 For an affirmative agenda, see, e.g., Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women:
Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55 (1979); Powers, Sex
Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 WIs. L.
REV. 55; Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981).
8 Women now aspire to the constitutional protection afforded blacks. Even the
relatively more rigorous anti-discrimination principle applied to racial discrimination,
however, has not produced equality. See, e.g., D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERI-
CAN LAW (1980); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978).
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both because of their concrete impact on legislative power and individ-
ual right and because constitutional ideas reflect and shape culture.
The relationship between constitutional concepts and culture is re-
ciprocal. The rise of the women's movement in the early 1970's pro-
vided impetus for Supreme Court revision of constitutional standards
applicable to laws controlling reproduction and incorporating sex-based
classifications. The ideas of equality reflected both in Supreme Court
decisions under the fourteenth amendment and in the recently defeated
Equal Rights Amendment in turn generate more general thought about
sex-based equality. Contemporary ideas of equality are also reciprocal
in relation to our past in two significant ways. First, historically, biol-
ogy provided a central justification for the subjugation of women. That
history partially explains the lack of focus on reproductive difference in
contemporary equality doctrine and also suggests the need for close at-
tention to such differences in developing new ideas of equality. Second,
"protection" of women-construction of the pedestal/cage-was a core
mechanism for oppression of women. Contemporary feminists are
hence rightly skeptical of measures that protect women by providing
them with special treatment. 9
At various periods the law has embodied different ideas about sex-
based differences. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, culture and reli-
gion required women to marry, and the law declared the married
woman dead.1" The law denied married women both identity and
power."" With the enactment of the married women's property acts in
9 On the damage that protective legislation does to women, see B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES
AND REMEDIES 26-53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as B. BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION]; Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686 (1980) (reviewing C. MACKIN-
NON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINA-
TION (1979)).
'0 "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated. . . into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover, she
performs everything ... ." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 430 (Oxford 1765) (footnote omitted).
I1 This incorporation of legal existence gave the husband all the power: "[He] was
regarded as her head and representative in the social state . . . ." Bradwell v. State,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). A married woman could
not bind herself by contract; her contracts were considered void, as an infant's, not just
voidable. Her husband gained control and management of her real property and com-
plete ownership of her personal property. Her services belonged to her husband.
Therefore, he had sole right to any wages she earned outside the home. His domicile
became hers. She could not sue or be sued; her husband had to be joined in any legal
action. If any recovery was obtained through a suit, the money belonged to him. Fi-
nally, symbolic of this loss of a separate identity, the woman was required to assume
her husband's name upon marriage. See, e.g., Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (D.
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the late 1800's, the law recognized women's existence.1 2 But two legal
constructs enforced the subservience of women and the dominance of
men in the home and wage market: first, the creation of separate
spheres for men and women and, second, enactment of limits on
women's power to control reproductive capacity.
Assumptions about biological difference and destiny provided the
prime justification for creating a separate, inferior legal status for
women."' The law denied women equal opportunity for wage work
Ala. 1971), affd, 401 U.S. 970 (1972); see also Lamber, A Married Woman's Sur-
name: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 783-95 (1973).
Although the woman gained certain protections through marriage-immunity
from her debts, torts, and certain criminal actions, as well as an almost unenforceable
right to support-she was severely handicapped in her ability to function in the public
sphere. The laws regarding married persons "ha[ve] worked out in reality to mean that
though the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband." United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). For further readings on the topic, see
B. BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 9; L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE
LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969).
12 See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School
Curriculum, and Development Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1972).
'3 Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1873), is the classic statement of the 19th century view of a woman's place in this
society:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man
is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood ...
[Tihe paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the no-
ble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of
things ....
Id. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), the Court again viewed women's anit-
omy as destiny:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is ob-
vious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon
her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical frater-
nity[,] continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from
day to day, tends to injurious effect upon the body, and as healthy mothers
are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman be-
comes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race.
Id. at 421.
Employment was not the only area in which the Court used "natural" differences
between the sexes to justify laws denying women the rights and responsibilities of male
citizens. Women and the blind were given special "protection" by a Georgia statute
requiring payment of a poll tax. "In view of burdens necessarily borne by them for the
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and participation in public life.14 It reinforced social and religious com-
mitment to family-centered child rearing. Women were required, by
law and custom, to care for men and children.15 Although women and
children were and are entitled to look to men for financial support, that
expectation was and is not theoretically enforceable during an ongoing
marriagee nor as a practical matter when marriage ends.
17
preservation of the race, the State reasonably may exempt [women] from poll taxes."
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937). Unlike the blind, however, women were
only exempt if they did not register to vote. In effect, the statute alleviated the tax
burden by discouraging women from participating in the political process. Id.
1' The need for a woman to "proper[ly] discharge . ..her maternal function"
justified the maximum hours law in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908), and
other laws "protecting" women by limiting their employment opportunities. See
WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF
STATE LABOR LAWS FOR WOMEN (1969), reprinted in The "Equal Rights" Amend-
ment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amendments of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 729 (1970); Oldham, Sex Discrim-
ination and State Protective Laws, 44 DEN. L.J. 344 (1967).
These laws helped create the sex segregated job market, with the more lucrative
positions reserved for men. See generally Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segre-
gation and Women Workers, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 19 (1979-80); Ross, Sex Segre-
gation and "Protective" Labor Legislation, reprinted in The "Equal Rights" Amend-
ment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Amendments of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1970). Further, sex segrega-
tion in employment has not decreased in recent years and some indicators show it is
actually increasing. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1975 HANDBOOK
ON WOMEN WORKERS (1975); see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL
INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1978). When women-only
protective labor laws were in force, employers could completely disqualify women from
jobs by defining a job as requiring overtime, night work, or heavy lifting. Maximum
hour laws denied women higher paid overtime work. Finally, forced maternity leaves
denied women work and seniority, see, e.g., the policies struck down in Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974). These protective laws gave women the option of staying at home or taking
employment in lower paid, less desirable jobs.
" On the assumption that parents bear primary responsibility for the care and
nurture of children, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923). The presumption that mothers
rather than fathers bear primary responsibility for the home and the nurture of chil-
dren is pervasive and has often been proffered as the justification for public policies
providing differential treatment for men and women. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961); see also infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
1" In Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L. REv. 28 (1935), the economic relation
between husband and wife was analogized to that between master and slave.
Under what may be called the normal circumstances of marriage, her
right of support is the right to live with him. ...
So long as the spouses are living together, the wife's right of support
is not a right to any definite thing or to any definite amount even in pro-
portion to the husband's means. Depending on his personality, and hers,
the chances-which have nothing to do with legal rights-may be either
that she will with difficulty get an inadequate subsistence or that she will
live in idleness and luxury. This is precisely the situation in which prop-
erty finds itself; it may be overworked and underfed, or it may be petted
1984]
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For most of the twentieth century, the law also preserved the dom-
inance of men by creating obstacles to women's ability to control their
reproductive capacity. Beginning in the mid-1800's the law restricted
access to contraception and abortion.' 8 Sex outside of marriage was
condemned, by society and the law, much more harshly and consistently
for women than for men. 9 If 'an unmarried woman became pregnant,
and fed with cream, and that is a matter for the owner to decide.
Id. at 33. For a more modem perspective on the support/service dichotomy, see B.
BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 9, at 619-31.
17 D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUP-
PORT (1979).
18 For a discussion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-44 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" The sexual double standard creates differing sexual roles and expectations in
society for men and women. Men are to be sexually aggressive; women are to have no
sexual drives at all. See, e.g., infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text. The double
standard gives women two options: to fulfill their assigned role as asexual and be re-
vered or to accept their sexuality and endure society's condemnation. The laws reflect
both choices by protecting "virginal" women and punishing women who express their
sexuality.
Criminal law protects both a woman's reputation and her physical chastity. Some
states penalize impugning the chastity of a woman. For example, Oklahoma makes it a
crime to "orally or otherwise, falsely and maliciously . . . impute to any female, mar-
ried or unmarried, a want of chastity." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 779 (West 1983);
see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 836.04 (West 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.58.110
(1977). Seduction is the crime of persuading a chaste woman to have sexual intercourse
using some form of deception; some states require that there be a false promise to
marry the woman. "[A] man who induces a woman to surrender her chastity by flat-
tery, promises or artifice" may be guilty of seduction. 70 AM. JUR. 2D Seduction § 1
(1973).
Statutory rape laws traditionally punished men for consensual intercourse with a
female under a certain age. The age has ranged from as young as 10 to as old as 20.
See Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REv. 757,
762 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Statutory Rape]; Comment, Forcible and
Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Stan-
dard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76 (1952). ("[T]he law of statutory rape must intervene to
prevent what is predicted will be an unwise disposition. And prevention is sought...
by sanctioning the male, who is always assumed to be responsible for the occurrence.").
Prostitution laws provide a classic example of the law's sexual double standard.
Some prostitution laws apply only to women, and facially neutral laws are enforced
primarily against them. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,
962-63 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown, ERA Article]. Prostitution is defined as "the
practice of a female offering her body to indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men,"
63 AM. JUR. 2d Prostitution § 1 (1972), or submitting "to indiscriminate sexual inter-
course which she invites or solicits." Id. She "solicits" then "submits." A woman who
will have sex with many men is a "common prostitute" and a criminal while a sexually
active man just has a healthy sex drive.
Young women whose chastity is not "saved" through statutory rape laws may be
subject to various sanctions. Until the 1970's, pregnant high school students were com-
monly expelled from school. In Texas in 1971, "[o]f 119 school districts, 105 compelled
pregnant girls to withdraw from regular classes. Of those 105, 55 offered no substitute
services . . . ." Comment, Marriage, Pregnancy, and the Right to Go to School, 50
TEx. L. REv. 1196, 1196 n.3 (1972). Boys who fathered the children were free to
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she needed to persuade a man to marry her. The law did not compel a
continue their education. Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971),
held this type of school policy a possible violation of the Civil Rights Act. Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (1972),
prohibits sex discrimination in education programs receiving federal aid; federal regula-
tions prohibit discrimination against students on the basis of pregnancy. See 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.21(c)(2) (1983).
Young women who are sexually active may be punished through the juvenile jus-
tice system. A study of the New York system in 1974 found allegations of promiscuity,
prostitutinn, cohabitation, and general sexual innuendo were made exclusively against
females; all these allegations were grounds for a finding of "ungovernability." Note,
Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1388-89 n.41
(1974).
The punishment of women who violate the double standard is reflected in litera-
ture as well as laws. The classic literary example is The Scarlet Letter by Nathaniel
Hawthorne. The adulteress, Hester Prynne, was made to bear the scorn and condem-
nation of society symbolically displayed by a scarlet "A" for adulteress on her chest.
Because she became pregnant, her indiscretion was publicly known. Her lover's iden-
tity, however, remained a secret. Hester actually may have been better off than other
sexually active women in literature; she and her child both survived. Hemingway's
Catherine in A Farewell to Arms died in childbirth after having an illicit affair; the
child was also born dead. In Thomas Hardy's Tess of the D'Urbervilles, Tess's hus-
band confessed to her his sexual past. She then confessed to him that after being raped
she had borne a child that died. Her husband abandoned her and she returned to a
sexual relationship with the man who had raped her. Eventually she killed him and
was executed for his murder. The sexual woman either lives a condemned life or dies
as payment for her sexual behavior.
In recent years, the prohibition on women's sexuality has eroded. The prevalence
of sexual activity among never-married American teenage women increased by 30%
between 1971 and 1976, so that by age 19, 55% have had sexual intercourse. The
increase has occurred at all ages and among all races. Zelnik & Kantner, Sexual and
Contraceptive Experience of Young Unmarried Women in the United States, 1976 and
1971, 9 Fm. PLAN. PERSPEcTIVEs 55 (1977).
Change is observable in the proliferation of such works as I. KASSORLA, NicE
GIRLS Do (1980); G. MAsTERTON, How TO DRIVE YOUR MAN WILD IN BED
(1976); M. SANDS, THE MISTRESS' SURVIVAL MANUAL (1982), and in the latest
scenes of pre-marital and extra-marital sex in the movies and on television. Sex is ever
more explicitly used to sell books, magazines, and movies as well as perfumes, cars, and
jeans.
Whether this "sexual liberation" is really liberating is a different question.
Sexual health, measured either physically or psychologically, is in some
respects deteriorating, as evidenced in spreading venereal disease, rape,
and sexual encounters stripped of obligations between people as
subjects ...
The problem with the commercialization of sexual pleasure is not
merely that it fosters fragmented sexual experience. These new permissive
standards and practices remain fundamentally deformed by male-suprem-
acist practices and attitudes and a heightened instrumentalism, people us-
ing one another as mere tools for personal satisfaction. ...
As men once took advantage of the sexual double standard and the
enforced chastity of their wives, now they often take advantage of the
mythical single standard to belittle and pressure women who resist their
sexual preferences. Thus the area of sexual relationships remains . . . a
major battlefield for feminists.
L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY WOMAN'S RIGHT 412-14 (1976).
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man to take responsibility for the pregnancy he had helped to cause or
the child he had helped to create.20 The law condemned the child as a
bastard and subjected the child to significant legal disabilities.21' Laws
disfavoring the children of an unmarried woman encouraged her sexual
purity and made the social and economic status of both the child and
mother "ultimately dependent upon the male."
'22
Legal structures that support the dominance of men and subservi-
ence of women are fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional ideals
of individual worth and equality of opportunity. It is crucial to under-
stand, then, why contemporary constitutional sex equality doctrine evi-
dences a lack of concern about the implications of state regulations that
are based on biological differences and have been prominent in estab-
lishing and perpetuating the inequality of women. The next two sec-
tions explore first the conceptual and then the historical factors that
may indicate why our present equality doctrine carefully scrutinizes ex-
plicit sex-based classifications while essentially ignoring laws governing
sex-based biological differences. This history also demonstrates that the
development of sex equality doctrine that excludes concern for sex-spe-
cific biology occurred at the same time the Supreme Court recognized a
privacy-based right of reproductive freedom. The result of this history
is that we have been virtually blinded to the relevance of equality no-
tions when evaluating state limitations on a woman's access to abortion.
The third section of the article discusses another consequence of
the Court's failure to focus on the myth and reality of biological differ-
ences: the Supreme Court now justifies deferential scrutiny of explicit
sex-based classifications that raise significant problems of sex equality
by finding that the laws are based on "real" differences between men
and women.
Section IV presents my central thesis that sex equality doctrine
must confront squarely the reality of categorical biological differences
between men and women. To reconcile the ideal of human equality
with the reality of biological difference we must (1) begin to distinguish
clearly between laws that classify on the basis of sex and laws that
20 See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
21 The concept of illegitimacy was created to insure male dominance. See H.
KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 83 (1971). Krause argues that the
problem of illegitimacy must be solved by maximizing paternity determinations. For a
defense of the mother/child family, see Book Review, 19 UCLA L. REv. 845 (1972);
see also Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (denial of equal
recovery rights to illegitimate children violates equal protection clause); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967) (denial of recovery right for illegitimate children violates equal
protection clause).
22 K. MILLETr, SEXUAL PoLITIcs 35 (1970).
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govern reproduction; (2) recognize that laws governing reproduction
implicate equality concerns; and (3) establish a test that can determine
when laws governing reproduction violate constitutional equality
norms. The test proposed here will then be applied to a variety of gov-
ernmental policies, including limits on access to abortions. This appli-
cation indicates the value of a unified approach to sex equality.
I. VISIONS OF SEx-BASED EQUALITY
Legal concepts of equality are informed by social vision. A grow-
ing literature attempts to give concrete content to social visions of sex-
ual equality.23 In legal doctrine the dominant vision of sex equality is
an assimilationist one, which conceives of a society in which sex would
be a wholly unimportant characteristic of individuals, having no greater
significance than eye color has in our own society.2" The assimilationist
ideal posits that some characteristics-race, sex, eye color-do not de-
scribe differences that should ever be allowed to matter in any signifi-
cant way. Even in the most personal social relations, an individual who
selected friends on the basis of eye color would be regarded as idiosyn-
cratic. The assimilationist vision asserts that it is unjust to distribute
rights or responsibilities on the basis of distinctions that do not ever
describe relevant differences-sex, race, or eye color. This vision is best
developed in relation to race. The assimilationist view of sex equality is
attractive to constitutional lawyers because it builds upon analogies be-
tween race- and sex-based discrimination.
The analogies between race- and sex-based discrimination are
powerful.25 Blacks and women share a similar history of oppression;
prior to the Civil War the laws defining the status of blacks and
women borrowed freely from one another .2 Sex, like race, is an immu-
23 See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Jaggar, On Sexual
Equality, 84 ETHICS 275 (1974); Scales, supra note 7; R. WASSERSTROM, Racism and
Sexism, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDIES 11 (1980); Wasserstrom,
Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L.
REV. 581 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wasserstrom, Topics].
24 Wasserstrom, Topics, supra note 23, at 585-86. Wasserstrom urges that we
differentiate three different perspectives in thinking about racism or sexism. One per-
spective considers the way our society currently exists with respect to sex or race: the
"social reality." The second perspective considers how things ought to be in relation to
sex or race: the "ideal." The third considers the best mechanism for the transition from
the "social reality" to the "ideal." Separating these three perspectives helps provide a
framework for analyzing affirmative action. Id. at 581, 583.
25 For a criticism of the analogy between racism and sexism, see B. HOOKS, AIN'T
I A WOMAN 19-58 (1981).
26 S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX xxiii (1968); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA 1073-78 (1944); Fitzhugh, Sociologyfor the South, in SLAVERY DEFENDED
34 (E. McKitrick ed. 1963).
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table and highly visible characteristic. 7 Women, like blacks, continue
to occupy a position of economic inferiority. Indeed, as compared to
white men, women are more economically disadvantaged than blacks,
and black women are doubly disadvantaged.2 Although women are not
a minority, they were denied the franchise until 1920, and today
women exercise limited political power." Finally, and most impor-
27 See Hacker, Women As a Minority Group, 30 SOCIAL FORCES 60 (1951). Not
all immutable characteristics are suspect, for example height or lefthandedness. For a
discussion, see Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theo-
ries, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-79 (1980). But sex seems significantly more important
than other physical characteristics and, apart from reproduction, bears little relation to
individual ability to perform or contribute.
28 In 1939 the median income of full-time full-year workers was:
white men: $1,419
white women: 863
black men: 639
black women: 327
By 1964 the relative economic positions of white women and black men had shifted:
white men: $6,497
black men: 4,285
white women: 3,859
black women: 2,674
WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, FACT SHEET
ON THE RELATIVE POSITION OF WOMEN AND MEN WORKERS IN THE ECONOMY
(1981). By 1979, the gap between males and females had grown quite large:
white men: $12,372
black men: 7,743
white women: 4,394
black women: 4,023
Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 1981: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on La-
bor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
Among year-round, full-time workers, the median income of black, male high
school graduates exceeds that of white female college graduates. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME:
MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
1980.
" In 1982 only 6.9% of federal judges and 12.1% of state legislators were women.
In the Congress there were two women in the Senate and 19 women in the House in
1982. Statistics from Eagleton Center for the American Woman and Politics, Rutgers
University, New Brunswick, N.J. The Supreme Court has recognized that sometimes a
numerical majority must be treated like a minority for purposes of equal protection
analysis. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), the Court held that a prima
facie case of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the selection of grand jurors
was not constitutionally affected by the fact that Mexican-Americans had a "governing
majority" in the affected county. Justice Marshall explained, "Social scientists agree
that members of minority groups fiequently respond to discrimination and prejudice by
attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of adopting the
majority's negative attitudes towards the minority." Id. at 503 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring). Certainly part of the reason for the second-class status of women is that they
accept the stereotypes of their own inferiority.
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tantly, sex, like race, "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society."3
Although these factors support the conclusion that classifications
based on sex, like those based on race, should be regarded as constitu-
tionally suspect, there are also important points of difference between
sex- and race-based discrimination. There is no reason to believe that
black and white people are inherently different in any way that should
ever be allowed to matter in the law.31 Men and women, by contrast,
are different in significant sex-specific physical ways. Most differences
between men and women are like differences between blacks and
whites: statistical generalizations, which are more or less true in the
aggregate but untrue in relation to particular individuals. Accurate sta-
tistical differences between men and women that are false in individual
cases include weight, height, longevity, mathematical aptitude, aggres-
sion, capacity for nurturance, and physical strength. There are, how-
ever, other categorical differences between men and women that are not
simply statistical generalizations, but rather sex-based physical differ-
ences relating to reproductive capacity. By categorical sex-based differ-
ences, what is meant, and all that is meant, is that most women and no
men possess the capacity to reproduce the species. This concept of cate-
gorical sex-based differences is not merely definitional but is grounded
John Ely, exploring this point, concludes, "To apply all this to the situation of
women in America in 1980, . . . is to strain a metaphor past the breaking point." J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 166 (1980). He
argues for relatively more rigorous scrutiny of sex-based laws of older vintage, enacted
when women were barred from the political process, but asserts that "if women don't
protect themselves from sex discrimination in the future, it won't be because they
can't." Id. at 69. One way in which oppression is perpetuated is to assume falsely that
equality has been achieved, when it has not. On the other hand, recognition of the
reality of oppression, particularly in the case of women, can perpetuate derogatory ste-
reotypes. The tension between these two dangers is persistent. Ely overestimates the
degree to which sex-based equality has already been achieved.
Today, every woman over 30 came to maturity in a world in which virtually no
one questioned the assumption that the woman's place was in the home and her func-
tion in life was to find and keep a man. Exercise of significant ambition today demands
a single-minded, egotistic devotion that is inconsistent with primary responsibility for
the care of children. For all the changes in attitudes toward women since 1970, there
has been little increase in male responsibility for nurturing or in the development of
other forms of child care that would free women for the intense work that exercising
political power demands. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, women who aspire to political office seem to be held to a very high standard to
avoid the appearance of being excessively driven or lacking nurturing qualities.
30 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion).
31 Although the prevalence of sickle cell anemia in black Americans is arguably a
race-specific physical difference between blacks and whites, this is not comparable to
sex-based differences in reproductive capacity. Only one quarter of one percent (.25%)
of American blacks have the disease, and only 8% are sub-clinical carriers of the sickle
cell trait. Thompson & Thompson, GENETICS IN MEDICINE 101 (1980).
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in physical reality.
The assimilationist presumption that sex-based differences are al-
ways insignificant is false. Although both law and culture exaggerate
the significance of biological differences, changes in social, cultural, and
legal arrangements could not make these differences disappear. Absent
development of a practical means to reproduce people outside a
woman's body, a technological development not now on the horizon, 2 it
is implausible to suggest that sex-based biological differences are whol-
ly insignificant. An assimilationist vision that ignores differences be-
tween men and women does not help us to reconcile the ideal of equal-
ity with the reality of difference.
A second vision of a sexually equal society recognizes differences
in the life experience of men and women, in relation to biology, psy-
chology, and moral development. The social reality that children are
raised by women means that the process of psychological maturation is
different for boys and girls. 3 Socially developed concepts of gender de-
l' Test-tube babies, produced from embryos fertilized in vitro, are not brought to
term in a laboratory. Shortly after fertilization, the embryo must be implanted in a
woman's uterus where it will complete its development for the normal period of gesta-
tion. Treichel, American's First Test-Tube Baby, 121 Sci. NEvs 7 (jan. 2, 1982).
Thus, the test-tube baby is in fact only a test-tube conception. The mature fetus is
carried and delivered by a woman through normal reproductive processes. Even such
"'test-tube' births are still extraordinary medical events." Id.
In animal research the technology of artificial reproduction is further advanced,
but, even here, science is far from full reproduction without implantation into the
womb of an adult female of the same species. Though scientists were first able to cul-
ture fertilized mouse ova, for example, about 15 years ago, they have only recently
reported culturing the developing mouse embryo for ten days prior to implantation. See
Chen and Hsu, Development of Mouse Embryos In Vitro: Preimplantation to the Limb
Bud Stage, 218 Sci. 66 (Oct. 1, 1982). Ten days is half of the normal gestation period
for mice. Mouse Embryos Reach Advanced Stage in Lab Dish, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5,
1982, C3, col. 1. This was the first known successful attempt to grow mouse embryo in
vitro to such an advanced stage of development. Id. This extraordinary accomplishment
could not readily be repeated in other laboratories.
" For example, Nancy Chodorow argues that female identify formation takes
place in a context of ongoing relationship since "[m]others tend to experience their
daughters as more like, and continuous with, themselves." N. CHODOROW, THE RE-
PRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 166 (1978). She asserts that girls, in identifying them-
selves as female, experience themselves as like their mothers, thus fusing the experience
of attachment with the process of identity formation. In contrast, "mothers experience
their sons as a male opposite," and boys, in defining themselves as masculine, separate
their mothers from themselves, thus curtailing "their primary love and sense of em-
pathic tie." Id. Consequently, male development entails a
more emphatic individuation and a more defensive firming of experienced
ego boundaries. . . . Girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing
another's needs or feelings as one's own (or of thinking that one is so
experiencing another's needs and feelings). . . . From very early, then,
because they are parented by a person of the same gender. . . girls come
to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continu-
ous with and related to the external object-world, and as differently ori-
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fine different expectations and value different qualities in males and
females. 4 Carol Gilligan, for example, describes differences in the
moral character of men and women. 5 Often, for men "leaving child-
hood means renouncing relationships in order to protect [their] freedom
of self-expression, . . [while for women] 'farewell to childhood' means
relinquishing the freedom of self-expression in order to protect others
and preserve relationships." 6 Men tend to be concerned with rights,
hierarchical relationships, and personal achievement while women are
concerned with caring and personal relationships.
The images of hierarchy and web, drawn from the texts of
men's and women's fantasies and thoughts, convey different
ways of structuring relationships and are associated with dif-
ferent views of morality and self. . . .As the top of the hier-
archy becomes the edge of the web and as the center of a
network of connection becomes the middle of a hierarchical
progression, each image marks as dangerous the place which
the other defines as safe. Thus, the images of hierarchy and
web inform different modes of assertion and response: the
wish to be alone at the top and the consequent fear that
others will get too close; the wish to be at the center of con-
nection and the consequent fear of being too far out on the
edge. These disparate fears of being stranded and being
caught give rise to different portrayals of achievement and
affiliation, leading to different modes of action and different
ways of assessing the consequences of choice.3
The strength of a vision of differences is that it recognizes the so-
cial importance of traditional female virtues of nurturing, responsibility
to others, and concern with relationships. In a society dominated by
ented to their inner object-world as well.
Id. at 16. See also D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL
ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE (1977); Sassen, Success Anxiety in Women: A
Constructivist Interpretation of its Sources and its Significance, 50 HARV. EDUC. REv.
(1980). For an excellent critique of Chodorow, arguing that her analysis gives too
much weight to early psychological development and too little to the legal and social
structures that enforce women's inferiority, see Lorber, Coser, Rossi & Ohodorow, On
The Reproduction of Mothering: A Methodological Debate, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN
CULTURE & Soc'y 482 (1981).
34 Ross & Rapp, Sex and Society: A Research Note from Social History and An-
thropology, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 51 (A. Snitow, C.
Stansell & S. Thompson ed. 1983); see also Baker, Biological Influences on Human
Sex and Gender, 6 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 80 (1980).
35 C. GILLIGAN, supra note 23.
36 Id. at 157.
37 Id. at 62.
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traditional male values, "assimilation" seems often to mean assimilation
to a male norm. 8 A vision of equality that incorporates respect for
differences between men and women hence places a higher value on
women's traditional virtues and work.
People have attempted to articulate a constitutional sexual equality
doctrine that would value traditional female characteristics. For exam-
ple, Elizabeth Wolgast advocates a constitutional idea of sex-based
equality grounded on diversity and tolerance that would recognize the
significance of sex-based differences and allow those differences to be
institutionalized and valued. At the same time, her theory would at-
tempt to mitigate the oppressive aspects of existing sex roles.3" This
vision borrows from the ideals of tolerance embodied in the first
amendment's religion clauses.40 Catharine MacKinnon advocates a
standard that would ask simply whether laws challenged as sex-dis-
criminatory empower women and enable them to participate as full
members of the society.
41
The difficulty with an ideal of a sexually equal society that re-
spects psychological and moral differences between men and women is
that many of these differences are socially created. Gilligan recognizes
that the differences she describes are "not absolute. . . . Clearly, these
differences arise in a social context where factors of social status and
power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of
males and females." '42 There is a great danger that affording legal re-
spect to presumed sex-based differences will perpetuate those differ-
ences. Furthermore, general rules premised on assumptions of universal
sex-based difference are unjust in relation to the individual men and
women who do not fit the presumed norm.
A constitutional theory based on either the assimilationist vision or
the respect-for-difference vision presumes that it is possible to answer
the question, "Are men and women essentially similar?," with a simple
yes or no. The assimilationist principle answers the question "yes" and
condemns laws that treat people differently. The respect-for-difference
principle emphasizes that, at least under present social conditions, the
situations of men and women are not essentially similar, and it would
" Note, Toward A Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487
(1981).
11 E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980); see also
Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. Rlv. 199, 205-16
(1979).
40 See also Wasserstrom, Topics, supra note 23, at 604-05.
41 C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF
SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
42 C. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 2.
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evaluate laws affecting men and women differently by asking whether
they empower and respect women.
A third vision, and the one that informs this article, assumes that
it is not possible to give a single answer to the question whether men
and women are essentially similar. We know that there are biological
differences between men and women in relation to reproduction. These
differences have been used to justify sex-based legal and cultural limita-
tions on human potential that do not reflect any real difference between
men and women43 and that enforce the inferiority of women and the
dominance of men. The vision of equality advocated here suggests that
the appropriate function of the law is not to enforce a general vision of
what men and women are really like, but rather to respect each per-
son's authority to define herself or himself, free from sex-defined legal
constraints." Our ability to develop this equality principle is enhanced
by focusing on the myth and reality of differences between men and
women.
Neither the assimilationist vision nor the respect-for-difference vi-
sion squarely confronts the problem of reconciling sexual equality with
the reality of biological differences. The assimilationist vision denies the
significance of biological differences. The vision of respect for difference
underestimates the difficulty of overcoming the legal constructs that
give oppressive social significance to such differences and thereby limit
human liberty and equality. The development of constitutional doctrine
in the past fifteen years has also failed to reconcile the idea of equality
with the reality of biological difference, in part because of the failure of
these dominant concepts of equality and in part because of the histori-
cal development of constitutional doctrine. A brief examination of this
history reveals some of the reasons for the failure to develop a theory of
sexual equality that addresses the biological differences between women
and men.
H. REMOVING BIOLOGY FROM SEX EQUALITY-A REVIEW OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
This section describes the historical antecedents of the two anomo-
4 Dress rules provide a graphic example of legal and cultural sex role constraint
not justified by biology. Men can't wear skirts. It is surely not biology that prevents
them from doing so. See Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in
Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73 (1982).
4" Of course it is not simply sex-based constraints that inhibit people's capacity for
self-definition. There are profound race- and class-based differences in the opportuni-
ties for significant life choices available to people. See Law, Women, Work, Welfare
and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249 (1983).
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lies in constitutional sex equality doctrine: the lack of an analytic
framework for assessing the relevance of biological differences and the
absence of sex equality principles from the constitutional reproductive
freedom doctrine.
A. The 1960's: Political Organizing and Consciousness-Raising
During the 1960's, the civil rights movement inspired many Amer-
icans to grapple with the ideal of equality and the difficulty of achiev-
ing it. Millions of blacks and whites saw the pervasiveness and subtlety
of racism. It is quite astonishing that throughout the decade, as the
Supreme Court decided cases that addressed issues of race discrimina-
tion and expanded concepts of constitutional equality beyond their his-
toric racial core,45 the Court never applied ideals of equality to sex-
based limitations.48 Through most of the 1960's few observed the paral-
45 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966).
46 The Warren Court never directly confronted claims brought by women asking
for equal treatment under the law. Three cases did discuss women's equality issues.
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), involved an equal protection claim raised in a
criminal trial. The female defendant claimed that automatic exemption of women from
juries violated her sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a fair trial by jury. The
claim was particularly appropriate since the defendant was charged with murdering
her husband, and women jurors might well have had a different perspective. The Court
rejected her claim, finding that because "woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life" the state could exempt her from jury duty. See id. at 62.
The Warren Court's decision in United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), also
involved underlying issues of women's equality. Ms. Yazell used the defense of cover-
ture to avoid liability on a federally financed loan made to her and her husband. She
claimed that under Texas law a married woman could not contract without judicial
permission. The court focused on whether federal or state law should govern and al-
lowed coverture to protect the woman from liability on the debt. Justice Black, dissent-
ing, condemned the law of coverture as an "archaic remnant of a primitive caste sys-
tem." Id. at 361 (Black, J., dissenting).
Finally, the Warren Court summarily affirmed, in Williams v. McNair, 401 U.S.
951 (1971), the lower court's decision which had rejected the equal protection claim of
a man who was denied admission to an all-female state college. But see Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (policy excluding men from state
nursing school violates equal protection clause).
During this period the lower courts considered sex-equality claims more directly.
Women challenged laws that gave men, but not women, the right to sue for loss of
consortium. See, e.g., Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969); Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37,
406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967). A policewoman challenged
the added requirement of an oral exam for female but not male candidates for sergeant.
See Wells v. Civil Service Comm'n, 423 Pa. 608, 225 A.2d 554, cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967). Women also sought to force states to open all their colleges to women as
well as men. See, e.g., Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
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lels between racism and sexism that Gunnar Myrdal had so trench-
antly documented in 1944.*7 Nonetheless, the growth of consciousness
supporting the aspiration of racial equality and the externally imposed
and internally accepted stereotypes that prevented its achievement facil-
itated perception of the injustice of sex-defined legal and social con-
straints on human freedom."8
By the late 1960's many women had participated in the civil rights
and antiwar movements and had learned new political skills.49 Also of
invaluable importance to the struggle for women's rights were the con-
sciousness-raising groups of the late 1960's." Through these groups
women discovered that their most intimate personal concerns were
shared by other women and that their private, individual lives were
47 See G. MYRDAL, supra note 26. In. fact, one ploy of some southern legislators
to defeat the enactment of civil rights legislation was to include a prohibition against
sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. J.R. POLE, THE PUR-
SUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 316 (1978).
4s There are parallels between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: a high level
of involvement of women in the struggle for racial liberation, an initial willingness on
the part of women to defer the assertion of their own claims to the struggle for racial
justice, and the eventual emergence of an expanded feminist consciousness, illuminated
by an understanding of racism. For a discussion of the women's movement in the nine-
teenth century, see E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1975). For a discussion of the women's move-
ment in the twentieth century, see J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM
(1971); Introduction in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE PoLrrcs OF SEXUAIrTY 9 (A.
Snitow, C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983).
One commentator has argued that "[tiwice in the history of the United States the
struggle for racial equality has been midwife to a feminist movement. In the abolition
movement of the 1830s and 1840s, and again in the civil rights movement of the
1960s. . . ." S. EVANS, PERSONAL PoLmcS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION
IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT 24 (1979). See also N. Mc-
GLEN & K. O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S RIGHTS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY IN THE
NINETEENTH AND TwENTIETH CENTURIES 23-24 (1983); V. RANDALL, WOMEN AND
POLITICS 147-48 (1982). Some commentators have suggested that the National Organi-
zation for Women (NOW) was modeled after the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP). See N. McGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra, at
24, 31; M. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA 310-11 (3rd ed. 1983).
"' Involvement in the antiwar movement and other New Left activities is seen by
several commentators as important to the development of the modern feminist move-
ment. See N. McGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra note 48, at 24-25 (importance of the
"counterculture and student and antiwar movements" to modern feminism); V. RAN-
DALL, supra note 48, at 149 (experience in "New Left movements" was a "trigger" to
the modern feminist movement); M. RYAN, supra note 48, at 310-11 (antiwar and
New Left movements along with civil rights movement "catalyze[d]" the modem femi-
nist movement).
In these movements women also learned the pervasive nature of sex discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., S. EVANS, supra note 48, at 179-85; M. RYAN, supra note 48, at 311
(women in these movements "confronted some particularly grating exhibitions of
misogyny.").
50 For discussions of the importance of consciousness raising groups, see, e.g., N.
McGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, supra note 48, at 24, 26; V. RANDALL, supra note 48, at
150, 166.
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shaped by deep social and cultural structures. These groups provided
women with the solidarity and strength to seek transformation of them-
selves and society. 51 The contemporary revision of constitutional doc-
trine in relation to sex equality and reproduction is the product of these
radical shifts in women's consciousness and behavior.
When women began challenging legal restraints on human liberty,
their central focus was on laws denying women access to abortion.,2
In a number of cities across the country there were women
coming forward and saying, I had an abortion, I had an ille-
gal abortion and this is how I had it, and telling the details.
What was really happening to women day in and day out
was no longer a matter of private horror and embarrassment
but became a public issue."3
These women, in cooperation with medical, family planning, and reli-
gious groups, persuaded many state legislatures to liberalize criminal
statutes prohibiting abortions."
In 1969 women began integrating constitutional litigation into this
organizational and educational effort. Suits often named hundreds and
sometimes thousands of women as individual plaintiffs.55 Live testi-
" This discussion is not intended to demean the importance to the modem femi-
nist movement of women who worked for women's rights throughout the twentieth
century. Such women have had a major impact. See, e.g., V. RANDALL, supra note 48,
at 148.
5 The first constitutional challenges to restrictive abortion laws were defensive.
They arose in response to criminal prosecutions of doctors charged with performing
abortions or with aiding and abetting the crime by referring patients to illegal abortion-
ists. See, e.g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d
954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). The
arguments in these early cases challenged the vagueness of exceptions to anti-abortion
statutes that allowed abortions where the woman's life or health was endangered and
sought expansion of the privacy right recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
" Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, Doe and Roe: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 1 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPrR. 20, 23 (1973); see also D. ScHULDER & F. KEN-
NEDY, ABORTION RAP (1971).
" By 1973, 14 states had adopted some form of MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3,
which allowed abortions when the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or
mental health of the mother, when the child would be born deformed, or when preg-
nancy resulted from feloneous intercourse. Four other states repealed criminal penalties
for abortions performed early in the pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140
n.37 (1973).
" See, e.g., Doe v. Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970) (brought on
behalf of hundreds of women); Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (presented claims of hundreds of women). Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d
1121 (2nd Cir. 1971), on remand, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410
U.S. 951, on remand, 369 F. Supp 807 (D. Conn. 1973), was one of the few cases in
which numbers of women were allowed to present testimony about the importance of
abortion. The initial district court opinion struck down the restrictive law on grounds
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mony educated judges, lawyers, and the public about the impact of un-
wanted pregnancy upon women's lives. Women filled courtrooms,
bringing babies and the coat hangers that symbolize illegal abortions.5"
Despite women's paramount concern for the right to obtain abortions,
the constitutionality of government restrictions on the right was not
presented to the courts as a clear issue of sex equality. Rather, women
challenged the abortion restrictions on two other grounds: first, the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of liberty, as explicated by the Su-
preme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,57 protected the right to an
abortion; second, the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equality
precluded certain limits on the availability of abortions because they
discriminated against poor and non-white women.5 In addition, in sev-
eral major cases, these claims by women were joined by physicians'
challenges to the abortion restrictions based on claims that the laws
were impermissibly vague and violated the privacy of the doctor/patient
relationship.59
B. The 1970's: Invalidating Sex Classifications via the
Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court did not apply the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equality to invalidate a sex classification until 1971, near
that the fourteenth amendment's protection of women's liberty encompasses the right to
decide whether to bear a child. It describes the impact of involuntary child bearing. See
342 F. Supp at 804. Abramowitz v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp 1048 (D.N.J. 1972), filed on
behalf of 1.200 women, was dismissed for lack of standing, while a companion case on
behalf of organizations and physicians held that the restrictive laws were unconstitu-
tionally vague and violated privacy rights. See YWCA of Princeton, N.J. v. Kugler,
342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972); Women of Rhode Island v. Israel, Civ. Nos. 4605 &
4586 (D.R.I. 1973) (challenged restrictive abortion laws as perpetuating an inferior
status prohibited by the nineteenth amendment) consolidated with Rhode Island Abor-
tion Counseling Service v. Israel, Civ. No. 4586 (D.R.I. 1971). In Ryan v. Spector,
Civ. No. 70-2527, (E.D. Pa. 1970), a three-judge court refused to dismiss a claim filed
by over 1000 named women plaintiffs.
" Goodman, Schoenbrod & Stearns, supra note 53, at 24-25.
57 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Abele
v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971), on remand, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn.
1972), vacated, 440 U.S. 951 (1973), rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 940 (1973), on re-
mand, 369 F. Supp. 807 (D. Conn. 1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293
(E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970); Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, 304
F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80
Cal. Rptr. 354, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) (first judicial language recognizing
the fundamental right of abortion).
" See supra note 53 for sources containing discussion of these cases by participat-
ing lawyers.
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the beginning of the Burger Court era.6 0 In Reed v. Reed6" the Court
struck down an Idaho law that gave men a blanket preference over
women as administrators of estates. The decision was simplicity itself.
There was little discussion of the appropriate standard of review. The
Court observed that legislative classifications must "be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."62 "To give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."63 But the
purpose of legislation designating who should administer estates is to
minimize interfamily disputes by avoiding the need for individualized
judgment. This sort of legislative classification is, in its nature, arbi-
trary. 4 Thus, the unanimous decision in Reed v. Reed signified that
'I The new era of constitutional doctrine was preceeded by a period of intense
activity and change in consciousness dimly reflected in stories in the New York Times. A
series of articles from May to August 1970 reported the National Women's Strike be-
ing called for by NOW. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 8, 1970, at 44, col. 1; id., Aug. 27,
1970, at 1, col. 2. Articles described demonstrations by women with attendance ranging
from a few hundred to thousands. See, e.g., id., Aug. 27, 1970, at 1, col. 2 (10,000
people); id., Dec. 13, 1970, at 66, col. 1 (300 people). Reports of changes in school
curriculum in response to the women's movement were printed. See, e.g., id., Jan. 7,
1971, at 37, col. 3 (colleges offering women's studies courses); id., Oct. 28, 1971, at 34,
col. 5 (law school offering women's clinic). Articles announced new women's organiza-
tions being formed and old women's organizations reevaluating their relevance. See,
e.g., id., Aug. 26, 1970, at 44, col. 3; id, July 13, 1971, at 37, col. 3. Groups of union
women announcing support for equal rights and groups of women just meeting to dis-
cuss the issues were covered. See, e.g., id., Sept. 15, 1970, at 33, col. 2. One group of
women psychologists demanded one million dollars in "reparations" from the American
Psychological. Association, claiming psychotherapy has perpetuated male supremacy
and contributed to mental illness among women; the money would be used to help
mentally disturbed women. See id., Sept. 6, 1970, § 1, at 28, col. 1. Another small
group of women seized a city-owned building to establish a health clinic and feminist
school. Id., Jan. 2, 1971, at 13, col. 1. General articles on the issues being debated in
the movement were also published. See, e.g., id., May 9, 1971, § 4, at 6, col. 1 (Chris-
tian theology and sex discrimination); id., Oct. 10, 1971, § 2, at 1, col. 1 (depiction of
women in films). Finally, politicians were covered as they signed orders and made
proclamations. See, e.g., id., Aug. 25, 1970, at 15, col. 1. The paper reported that
"women's liberation groups" charged "six years of prejudice against women" by
Mayor Lindsay. See id., Aug. 24, 1971, at 11, col. 1. Two days later, Mayor Lindsay
proclaimed August 26th as Women's Rights Day. Id., Aug. 26, 1971, at 8, col. 6.
61 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
62 Id. at 76 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
e 404 U.S. at 76.
6, No one would suppose that an arbitrary preference for the children as opposed
to siblings of the deceased, or vice versa, would be constitutionally infirm. Justice
Holmes described such classifications, saying,
When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be,
between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a
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classifications based on sex would be treated less deferentially by re-
viewing courts, but it failed to explain why or how."5
Another major development in relation to sex-based equality came
in 1971. The United States Congress held hearings on the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA), which was submitted to the states for rati-
fication in 1972.6 A centerpiece of the ratification hearings was a Yale
Law Journal article, written by several young feminist legal scholars
and Thomas Emerson, perhaps the nation's leading scholar of constitu-
tional civil rights and liberties.6 7 This article was intended to provide
an interpretative guide to the meaning of the proposed ERA, and it was
widely regarded as such, both in the Senate debate and in the subse-
quent ratification debates in the states."' The Yale ERA article estab-
point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by
successive decisions, to mark where the change takes place. Looked at by
itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems
arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or
the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that
there is no mathematical or logical ways of fixing it precisely, the decision
of the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of
any reasonable mark.
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65 See generally B. BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 9.
86 S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For congressional hearings in 1970-72, see Equal Rights 1970:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); The "Equal Rights" Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res.
61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hear-
ings on H.J. Res. 35, 208 and Related Bills & H.R. 916 and Related Bills Before
Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
87 Brown, ERA Article, supra note 19.
68 The Yale ERA analysis, as presented to the Congress by Professor Thomas
Emerson, was cited with approval by the congressional reports accompanying the pro-
posed amendment. See S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); Separate
Views Section of the House Report, H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1971);
117 CONG. REC. H. 35,797-98 (1971). The article was praised by the principal propo-
nents of the ERA. Congresswoman Griffiths sent a copy of it to all members of the
House, saying, "It will help you understand the purposes and effects of the Equal
Rights Amendment. The article explains how the ERA will work in most areas of the
law." 118 CONG. REC. 9083 (1972). Senator Bayh inserted a copy of the article in the
Congressional Record, describing it as a "masterly piece of scholarship." 117 CONG.
REc. 35,012 (1971). Senator Sam Ervin, a leading opponent of the amendment, stated,
"I agree that the Yale Law Journal article shows at a very minimum what the ERA
will accomplish." 118 CONG. REC. 9103 (1972). For a general discussion of the Con-
gressional debates, see Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE
L.J. 1533, 1534-38 (1973); Note, The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons, 82
YALE L.J. 1229, 1253-60 (1973).
Despite his general endorsement of the Yale ERA article, Senator Bayh, one of the
most vigorous proponents of the amendment, waffled somewhat on the question
whether women would be sent to combat on a strictly equal basis, saying that "the
Commander would not need to send a woman into the front trenches if he felt that it
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lished as the "basic principle" of the amendment that "sex is not a
permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men.
. ..In short, sex is a prohibited classification." 6 The article also con-
cluded, however, that the ERA would not prohibit all legislative dis-
tinctions between the sexes: The authors wrote that the fundamental
legal principle underlying the ERA "does not preclude legislation (or
other official action) which regulates, takes into account, or otherwise
deals with a physical characteristic unique to one sex. . . .This sub-
sidiary principle is limited to physical characteristics ....",0
The article argued that laws regulating these physical characteris-
tics should be scrutinized by courts in the same way that sex-neutral
rules that have a disparate impact on women would be scrutinized."1
The authors contended that the ERA would prohibit both such laws
when they served as a subterfuge for sex-based discrimination, 2 but
they did not advocate any independent principle for laws regulating
physical characteristics unique to one sex." Most interestingly, the ar-
would not be in the best interests of the combat unit to make such an assignment." 118
CONG. REC. S.9332 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (statement supporting military service
for women).
69 Brown, ERA Article, supra note 19, at 889.
70 Id. at 889, 893.
711 Id. at 898-99; see id. at 895-96.
72 The primary example of a subterfuge for sex-based discrimination, presented in
the section headed, "Laws Dealing with Physical Characteristics Unique to One Sex,"
is "a government regulation to reduce absenteeism at policy-making levels by barring
women from certain jobs." Id. at 894. The article then suggests five criteria by which
we could determine whether such a law was in fact one relating to a unique physical
characteristic or whether it was rather a subterfuge for sex discrimination: the propor-
tion of women who have the characteristic; the relation between the characteristic and
the problem; "the proportion of the problem attributable to the unique physical charac-
teristic of women"; "the proportion of the problem eliminated by the solution"; "the
availability of less drastic alternatives." Id. at 895-96. A law barring all women from
certain jobs is not one "dealing with physical characteristics unique to one sex." It is
explicit sex discrimination. See infra notes 200-15 and accompanying text.
7 See also Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Con-
stitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. Rv. 1499 (1971). After exploring the similari-
ties between race- and sex-based discrimination, this analysis addressed the limits of the
race/sex analogy:
[W]omen may differ from men in ways which might rationally be reflected
in statutes. For example, women appear to live longer on the average and
exclusively possess the procreative function. Some alleged differences may
turn out, on further investigation, to be products of environment and
training rather than of immutable physiology. Until further studies are
made, however, the possibility that the apparent differences are real must
be acknowledged. Laws classifying on the basis of such apparent differ-
ences between the sexes might be upheld . . ..
Id. at 1508-09 (footnotes omitted). This is the whole of the discussion of the myth and
reality of biological difference in a 25-page analysis of sex discrimination. It does not
recognize that the procreative function may distinguish men and women in a way that
is categorically different than statistical differences in longevity. It is hard to see how
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tide's discussion and application of its test to regulations of physical
characteristics made no mention of laws restricting access to abortions.
Nor did the article mention laws excluding pregnant women from
health insurance programs. These two omissions are especially striking
because abortion rights and pregnancy benefits are much more central
to the goal of sex equality than the examples discussed in the article,
such as laws that regulate wet nurses, sperm donors, medical leave for
childbearing, and determination of fatherhood. 4
A third significant development occurred during the 1971 Supreme
Court term, four months after Reed. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 7  the
Court struck down a Massachusetts law prohibiting the distribution of
contraceptives, except by doctors to married people, on grounds that the
distinction between married and unmarried people violated equal pro-
tection. Eisenstadt is a difficult case.7" To this day, the criminal law in
many states prohibits sex between unmarried people, and the Court has
not disapproved this distinction between the married and the unmar-
ried.7 7 Sex-based equality could have provided a stronger basis for the
further investigation is likely to disprove this categorical difference or tell us how to
regard it.
74 See Brown, ERA Article, supra note 19, at 894.
75 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
7' Both the Court and commentators have subsequently read Eisenstadt as a deci-
sion resting on the right to privacy or the due process concept of fundamental fairness.
A Lexis search in March 1984 reveals that Eisenstadt has been cited by the Supreme
Court 40 times. Five of those cites were on the standing issue. Seven cites were for
general discussion of the type of analysis to be used for equal protection claims. The
remaining 28 cases cited Eisenstadt in connection with the right to privacy recognized
in Griswold.
Two of the equal protection cases citing Eisenstadt involved claims of sex discrimi-
nation. Both Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting), cite the case for the proposition
that the court need not "accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes." Wein-
berger, 420 U.S. at 648. See Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 520.
Some commentators, writing immediately following Eisenstadt, analyzed it as an
equal protection case. See, e.g., The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REV. 52,
116 (1972). More recently it has been cited as a privacy case. See, e.g., Brest, The
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitu-
tional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1981). At least one commentator has
discussed the case as both a privacy and an equal protection case. See Karst, The Free-
doin of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 641, 662-63 (1980).
Although the result in Griswold supported recognition of a constitutionally pro-
tected right to personal autonomy in relation to the decision whether or not to bear or
beget a child, the specific holding of Griswold was narrower. Griswold invalidated only
that portion of Connecticut's statute that banned "use" of contraceptives by married
people and was closely tied to the physical privacy of the bedroom, a privacy interest
arguably protected by the fourth amendment, as well as the more porous concepts of
due process and the ninth amendment. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 928-30 (1973).
77 In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), Justice Stevens stated,
"I would have no doubt about the validity of a state law prohibiting all unmarried
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decision in Eisenstadt. The differential burden that denying access to
contraceptives imposes upon women is not a facially neutral policy hav-
ing a disparate impact upon different groups of people 7 -no man
faces the physical risks of pregnancy. Even assuming that both parents
bear equal responsibility for the child after birth, only women are con-
fronted with the choice of obtaining an abortion or enduring the physi-
cal burdens of pregnancy. A more forceful decision in Eisenstadt, based
on the sex equality principle, could have accepted the legitimacy of the
state interest in discouraging sex outside of marriage, yet still concluded
that, despite this interest, denying women access to contraception
"prescribes pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punish-
ment for fornication. '7' The unwanted pregnancy is not simply a bur-
den women must, in the nature of things, bear. Where the state denies
access to contraception, it is a burden the state imposes."0
teenagers from engaging in sexual intercourse." Id. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78 See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
71 In Eisenstadt the Court found that "[it would be plainly unreasonable to as-
sume that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child
as punishment for fornication, which is a misdemeanor under Massachusetts [law]."
405 U.S. at 448. This assumption and a finding that it was not reasonable to character-
ize the law as a health measure were preludes to finding that the purpose of the law
was simply to restrict access to contraception.
The theme that imposing unwanted pregnancy as punishment for prohibited sex is
a violation of due process fairness was adopted by Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
in Carey v. Population Serv. International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating statute
prohibiting sale or distribution to minors and prohibiting display of contraceptives:
Although the State may properly perform a teaching function, it seems to
me that an attempt to persuade by inflicting harm on the listener is an
unacceptable means of conveying a message that is otherwise legitimate.
The propaganda technique used in this case significantly increases the risk
of unwanted pregnancy and venereal disease. It is as though a State de-
cided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of
safety helmets. One need not posit a constitutional right to ride a motorcy-
cle to characterize such a restriction as irrational and perverse.
Even as a regulation of behavior, such a statute would be defective.
Assuming that the State could impose a uniform sanction upon young per-
sons who risk self-inflicted harm by operating motorcycles, or by engaging
in sexual activity, surely that sanction could not take the form of deliber-
ately injuring the cyclist or infecting the promiscuous child. If such pun-
ishment may not be administered deliberately, after trial and a finding of
guilt, it manifestly cannot be imposed by a legislature, indiscriminately
and at random. This kind of government-mandated harm, is, in my judg-
ment, appropriately characterized as a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.
Id. at 715-16 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
80 The sex differential nature of the law is confirmed by examination of the state
purpose asserted to justify it. The ideal of chastity and moral virtue that Massachusetts
sought to promote was the ideal of the sexual double standard, which demanded chasti-
ty principally of women. See supra note 19. The Massachusetts court, in construing the
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Despite the strength of these sex discrimination arguments, they
were not advanced in Eisenstadt for perfectly understandable reasons.81
Eisenstadt was argued on November 17, 1971. Reed was decided five
days later. Although sex equality was in the public consciousness,8 2 Su-
preme Court cases provided no support for an assertion that equality
had anything to do with women.
The possibility of greater judicial sensitivity to issues of sex equal-
ity was, however, suggested by the Court's decision in Reed. Two years
later, ACLU counsel Ruth Bader Ginsburg urged, in Frontiero v.
Richardson,8" that the Court's scrutiny of sex-based classifications be
formalized and that such classifications, like those based on race, be
treated as constitutionally suspect. The task confronting the appellants
in Frontiero was formidable. At that time, the prevailing constitutional
law still included Bradwell v. Illinois,84 Muller v. Oregon,85 Goesaert
v. Cleary,8  and Hoyt v. Florida.7 The ACLU brief discussed these
cases under the consummately understated banner, "Precedent in Need
of Reevaluation." '88 The argument urging that sex-based classifications
be treated as constitutionally suspect incorporated three themes. First,
historically women have been subjugated, their essential humanity de-
nied, and the pedestal upon which they have been placed has all too
often been a cage. Second, women seek to be judged on their individual
merits; the stereotypes of married women as economically dependent
law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people, found that its
purpose was "to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage continence and self-
restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home and thus to engender . . . a virile and
virtuous race of men and women." Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 62, 116
N.E. 265, 266 (1917), quoted in Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448. However, the Massachu-
setts .law allowed distribution of condoms, for use in preventing venereal disease. Citing
the circuit court opinion, the Supreme Court noted, "It is 200 years since Casanova
recorded the ubiquitous article. . . . We cannot think the legislature was unaware of
it, or could have thought it needed a medical prescription." 405 U.S. at 451 n.9. The
Court observed that the medical risks associated with the vaginal foam distributed to
women had not been proved to be greater than the medical risks associated with con-
doms. See id. at 464 (White, J., concurring). The Court, however, did not focus on the
fact that that only those safe forms of contraception used and controlled by women were
prohibited, while those used and controlled by men were allowed.
81 An amicus curiae brief was filed in Eisenstadt by Human Rights for Women,
Inc. and argued that denying access to contraception has a disproportionate effect upon
women.
82 See supra note 60.
8 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
8 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
8 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
87 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
" Amicus Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union at 34, Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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are inaccurate generally and particularly as applied to the Frontieros.
And third, sex is an immutable characteristic that frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute.89 Historical oppression, the
value of individuality, and the presumptive inaccuracy of sex-based ste-
reotypes all supported vigorous scrutiny of sex-based classifications.
Like the Yale ERA article, the ACLU brief in Frontiero did not
focus on the reality of biological difference. It mentioned biological dif-
ference only once, stating that legislative "discrimination grounded on
sex, for purposes unrelated to any biological difference between the
sexes, ranks with legislative discrimination based on race."90 The fail-
ure to address the issue of biological difference is justifiable in relation
to the specific claim presented by Sharon Frontiero, who was challeng-
ing a law that required that male spouses-but not female spouses-be
actually dependent, in order to receive military benefits. Biological dif-
ferences had no relation to the sex discriminatory military pay policy at
issue in the case. "1 But if the Frontiero briefs are examined not simply
as an individual family's challenge to a sex discriminatory pay policy
but as an attempt to articulate a coherent scheme for addressing issues
of sex equality, the failure to address in any detail the relation between
equality and biological difference is puzzling. It is also troubling that
the brief's only reference to biological difference suggests that laws
based on such difference may not raise equality concerns and, conse-
quently, may not need to be scrutinized as carefully.
In Frontiero, four Justices ruled that sex-based classifications
should be regarded as constitutionally suspect.92 Four Justices con-
curred in the result but thought it sufficient to invalidate the classifica-
tion as unreasonable, without addressing the general issue of the appro-
priate constitutional standard for judging sex-based classifications. 3
On January 23, 1973, just after the argument in Frontiero, the
Court held in Roe v. Wade9 4 that the constitutional right to privacy
protects the right of women and their physicians to determine whether
89 Id. at 24-28.
90 Id. at 7.
9' The irrelevance of biology did not prevent the government from invoking biol-
ogy to justify the pay discrimination and arguing that "sex classifications are commonly
founded upon physiological and sociological differences." Brief for Appellees at 17,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The government's brief described laws
prohibiting women from tending bar as "based on objective differences between the
sexes." Id.
92 411 U.S. at 682-91.
9' Id. at 691. The concurring opinion also cited the pendency of the proposed
ERA as a reason for avoiding decision on the standard applicable under the fourteenth
amendment. See id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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or not to terminate pregnancy.9 5 Nothing the Supreme Court has ever
done has been more concretely important for women.9 6 Laws denying
access to abortion have a sex-specific impact. Although both men and
women seek to control reproduction, only women become pregnant.
Only women have abortions. Laws restricting access to abortion have a
devastating sex-specific impact. Despite the decision's overwhelming
importance to women, it was not grounded on the principle of sex
equality. The plaintiffs in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton97 had not
challenged the abortion restrictions as sex discriminatory,"8 and the Su-
preme Court did not rely upon the sex-specific impact of laws restrict-
ing access to abortion.99
Thus, during the early 1970's the constitutional rights of women
began to be recognized by the Supreme Court, but several forces en-
couraged the Court to avoid addressing the relationship between sex-
based equality and biological differences. First, those primarily respon-
sible for developing a constitutional doctrine of sex-based equality, in-
cluding the ACLU and the proponents of the ERA, adopted what
amounted to an assimilationist vision of sex equality, which minimized
the significance of biological differences. Second, many who worked to
develop constitutional doctrine to support reproductive freedom empha-
sized rights of privacy, physician discretion, and the vagueness and un-
certainty of the criminal laws prohibiting abortions. The decision to de-
emphasize sex discrimination in the reproductive freedom cases re-
05 Id. at 154.
96 1 would defend this statement by comparing other decisions that possibly come
close to Roe v. Wade in importance to women, but I cannot think of anything that is
arguably a close second.
97 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
,1 The Texas statute challenged in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), made
abortions illegal unless performed to save the life of the mother. The plaintiffs in Roe
argued that a person's right to care for one's own health and a constitutional right to
privacy were being unduly burdened by the statute. The plaintiffs also asserted a phy-
sician's right to administer health care without arbitrary interference from the state. See
Roe, 410 U.S. at 120-22.
The Georgia statute challenged in Doe v. Bolton allowed abortions only when the
pregnancy threatened the life or health of the mother, the fetus would be born de-
formed, or the pregnancy resulted from rape. The statute also required three doctors'
certifications and approval by a hospital committee, and it prohibited abortions per-
formed outside an accredited hospital. The plaintiffs in Doe argued that the statute
abridged a fundamental right to privacy and a physician's right to practice medicine
and that it was unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs also claimed that the woman was
denied due process by a procedure so cumbersome and time consuming as to "effec-
tively manipulate out of existence plaintiff's constitutional rights." Finally plaintiffs
argued that the statute discriminated against the "poor and Negro citizens, denying
them equal protection." Brief for Appellants at ii, iii, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
9" See the criticism infra notes 231-34.
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flected a judgment that privacy was a more conservative and, hence,
stronger constitutional tool than sex-based equality.
In cases challenging laws governing pregnant women it is particu-
larly difficult to avoid addressing the relationship between sex-based
equality and biological difference. In the 1972 and 1973 Terms the
Supreme Court was presented with three such cases. In each lawyers
for the pregnant women argued that courts should scrutinize legislation
adversely affecting pregnant women in the same way that they scruti-
nize laws incorporating explicit sex-based classifications. °
Struck v. Secretary of Defense*'0 presented the Court with a con-
stitutional challenge to an Air Force policy requiring the discharge of
pregnant officers. The Court remanded the case on grounds of moot-
ness10 2 and therefore avoided review on the merits of the policy.
Pregnant women in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleurl0
challenged a mandatory leave policy that required pregnant teachers to
go on unpaid maternity leave five months before the expected birth date
of the child and that prevented a teacher's return to work until the
child was at least three months old. Even though the policy was chal-
lenged as sex discriminatory and the Fourth Circuit decided the case on
that ground, 0 the Supreme Court avoided any discussion of the dis-
criminatory nature of the classification by striking down the policy be-
cause it "employ[ed] irrebuttable presumptions."' 0 5
Having thus avoided the sex discrimination claims of pregnant
100 The ACLU brief in Struck v. Secretary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972),
argued that "sex discrimination exists when all or a defined class of women (or men)
are subjected to disadvantaged treatment based on stereotypical assumptions that oper-
ate to foreclose opportunity based on individual merit." The ACLU urged that the
pregnancy regulations "should be subject to close scrutiny, identifying sex as a suspect
criteria for governmental distinctions." Brief for the Petitioner at 15, 26, Struck v. Sec-
retary of Defense, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). See also Brief for Appellees at 28, Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at 18, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
101 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
'02 The Air Force voluntarily abandoned its policy after it prevailed in the district
court. The Supreme Court rejected the ACLU's argument that the constitutional claim
was not thus made moot. See 409 U.S. at 1071.
lo3 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
1'0 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
105 414 U.S. at 648. The doctrine of unconstitutional presumptions employed by
the Court in LaFleur is often invoked to avoid analysis of a difficult alternative consti-
tutional claim. See, e.g., Berzanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Pre-
sumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); cf. Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in LaFleur, characterized the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine as "nothing less than an attack upon the very notion
of lawmaking itself." 414 U.S. at 660.
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women who were ready and able to work but barred from doing so, the
Court in Geduldig v. Aiello 0 6 finally addressed sex equality claims of
pregnant women in 1974, holding that discrimination against pregnant
people is not sex-based.
Criticizing Geduldig has since become a cottage industry. Over
two dozen law review articles have condemned both the Court's ap-
proach and the result.107 In addition, other general analyses of constitu-
tional doctrine intlude denunciations of the decision.'0 8 Even the princi-
106 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
o10 Erickson, Equality Between the Sexes in the 1980's, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 591
(1979); Fain, Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination, 5 TEX. So. U.L. REV. 54 (1978);
Ferrell, The Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution-Areas of
Controversy, 6 URB. LAW. 853 (1974); Ginsberg, Gender in the Supreme Court; the
1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Ginsberg, Gender and the Constitu-
tion, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617 (1974); Kirp & Robyn, Pregnancy, Jus-
tice, and the Justices, 57 TEX. L. REV. 947 (1979); Larson, Sex Discrimination as to
Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J. 805; Peratis & Rindskopf, Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion as a Sex Discrimination Issue, 2 WOMEN'S RTS. LAW REP. 26 (1975); Scales,
supra note 7; Weynand, Bearing the Cost of Bearing, 11 TRIAL 86 (1975); Comment,
Pregnancy Disability Benefits and Title VII: Pregnancy Does Not Involve Sex?, 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 257 (1977); Comment, Pregnancy and Employment Benefits, 27
BAYLOR L. REV. 767 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protec-
tion-Discrimination Against Pregnancy Is Not Sex Discrimination-Geduldig v.
Aiello, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 171; Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The
Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532 (1974); Comment, Pregnancy Disability
Benefits Under State Administered Insurance Programs, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 263
(1975); Comment, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: Defining the Equal Opportunity
Rights of Pregnant Workers, 10 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 605 (1978-79); Com-
ment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimi-
nation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1975); Comment, Current Trends in Pregnancy Ben-
efts-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 127 (1974); Note,
Title VII, Pregnancy, and Disability Payments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 381 (1976); Comment, Three Cases Against Motherhood, 2 GLENDALE
L. REV. 313 (1977); Note, Exclusion of Pregnancy from Coverage of Disability Benefits
Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 12 Hous. L. REV. 488 (1975); Note, The Impact of
Geduldig v. Aiello on the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 50 IND. L.J. 592
(1975); Comment, The 1978 Amendment to Title VII: The Legislative Reaction to the
Geduldig-Gilbert-Satty Pregnancy Exclusion Problem in Disability Benefit Programs,
27 LoY. L. REV. 532 (1981); Comment, Barefoot and Pregnant-Still: Equal Protec-
tion for Women in Light of Geduldig v. Aiello, 16 S. TEX. L.J. 211 (1975); Comment,
The Supreme Court 1974 Term and Sex-Based Classifications: Avoiding a Standard
of Review, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 375 (1975); Comment, Sex Discrimination in the
1970's: the Supreme Court Decisions, 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 149 (1974); Note, Preg-
nancy and Sex-Based Discrimination in Employment: A Post- Aiello Analysis, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 57 (1975); Note, Pregnancy Disability Benefits Denied: Narrowing the
Scope of Title VII, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173 (1977); Recent Developments, Geduldig
v. Aiello, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141 (1975); Case Note, Constitutional Law-Equal
Protection-Under a Compulsory Unemployment Disability Insurance System, a State
May Permissibly Exclude from Coverage Disability Resulting from Normal Pregnancy,
52 J. URB. LAW 591 (1974).
108 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-27 (1978); Karst, The Su-
preme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend-
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pal scholarly defense of Geduldig admits that the Court was wrong in
refusing to recognize that the classification was sex-based, but it argues
that the Court was correct in holding the classification reasonable. 09
The Court has not often relied upon the case and has held, in puzzling
terms, that discrimination against pregnant women is sometimes sex-
based. 1 Congress, responding to another Court decision that followed
the reasoning in Geduldig,111 has made plain that Title VII's prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination bars discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy.
11 2
ment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1977).
'19 See Ruthergien, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REv. 199
(1979); Schair, Sex Discrimination: The Pregnancy-Related Disability Exclusion, 49
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 684 (1975). Mendelson, in ERA, the Supreme Court, and Allega-
tions of Gender Bias, 44 Mo. L. REv. 1, 8 (1979), argues that "apart from rape,
pregnancy is always willful as compared to a heart attack" and thus may be treated
disfavorably.
110 A Lexis search in April 1984 revealed that Geduldig v. Aiello has been cited
by the Supreme Court in 10 cases. The earliest case citing Geduldig used it in a string
cite for the proposition that the Court need not decide if sex is a suspect class. See
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975). Five cases cited Geduldig for general equal
protection arguments regarding insurance programs. The Court specifically limited
Geduldig to questions involving insurance in Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 423
U.S. 44, 45 (1975), where the Court found Geduldig did not control.
In General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court applied
Geduldig's equal protection analysis to Title VII claims. Two later Title VII cases
distinguish General Electric. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), held
that "petitioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot
and do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not
suffer. The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics."
434 U.S. at 142. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978), condemned the use of sex-based actuarial tables, holding that "each of the
two groups of employees involved in this case is composed entirely and exclusively of
members of the same sex," unlike Gilbert and Geduldig where the two groups were
"pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 435 U.S. at 715. The most recent Su-
preme Court case citing Geduldig made clear that not only had the Court rejected both
Geduldig and Gilbert, but also that Congress had rejected those holdings by enacting
the Pregnancy Disability Act (discussed infra note 94). See Newport News Shipbldg. &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
'" General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
112 After the Court extended the "logic" of Geduldig to Title VII, Congress re-
acted swiftly to provide in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978 that "the
terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of
or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981). The thrust of the PDA is to require that pregnancy, child-
birth, and other related medical conditions be treated as well as any other medical
disability, not unique to one sex. See Erickson, Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytic
Approach, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 11 (1981); Scales, supra note 7 at 401-15.
Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983),
applied the PDA to invalidate an employer benefit program providing full medical
coverage for employees and their spouses but limiting maternity benefits for the wives
of male employees. The Court held,
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title
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Doctrinally, however, Geduldig has made it more difficult to claim
that reproductive freedom is an aspect of sex-based equality. If discrim-
ination against pregnant women is not sex-based when the woman
seeks to carry her pregnancy to term, it is hard to argue that it is sex-
based for the state to create obstacles to abortion."1 ' Since 1973, liter-
ally hundreds of legal challenges to restrictive abortion laws have been
brought,1 4 and only a very few of the cases have argued that the re-
strictions violated sex equality norms."1 5
VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face,
discrimination because of her sex. And since the sex of the spouse is al-
ways the opposite of the sex of the employee, it follows inexorably that
discrimination against female spouses in the provision of fringe benefits is
also discrimination against male employees.
Id. at 2631.
Although the PDA significantly limits the practical effect of the Supreme Court's
holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex-based, it does not affect
the general constitutional principle. Congress cannot overrule the Court's interpretation
of the Constitution. Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflec-
tions on Proposed 'Human Life' Legislation, 68 VA. L. REv. 333 (1982). Further, the
PDA is explicitly limited to defining discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and
childbirth as sex based and does not more broadly define all discrimination on the basis
of sex-specific physical characteristics as sex based. The PDA explicitly provides that it
"shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except
where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or
except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion . .. .
I'l However, the Court has recognized that "penalizing" forms of discrimination
against pregnant women are indeed sex based. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.
136 (1977); Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975). It is arguable
that forcing a woman to bear a child penalizes her.
114 See generally Legal Docket, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project. The na-
tional ACLU's Reproductive Freedom Project discouraged sex discrimination claims in
cases challenging restrictions on reproductive freedom.
115 Equality claims have been raised in a few lower courts. On January 18, 1978,
Hawaii Right to Life filed suit to enjoin the state of Hawaii from funding Medicaid
abortions. The local ACLU, representing several gynecologists practicing in Hawaii,
moved to intervene. One claim made by the local groups was that funding for Medicaid
abortions was required by the state equal rights amendment. See Motion to Intervene,
Hawaii Right to Life v. Chang, Civil No. 53567 (Feb. 20, 1979). This was the first
time a state ERA was used to defend abortion rights. The motion to intervene was
denied; the case was later decided by summary judgment in favor of the state funding
policy. See Hawaii Right to Life v. Chang, Civil No. 53567 (Feb. 20, 1979) (order
granting summary judgment). A similar sex discrimination claim was raised under the
Massachusetts ERA. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417
N.E.2d 387 (1981).
Right to Life News describes these cases, pointing out that "[t]he proposed federal
ERA has the same language" as the state ERA and expressing concern that if the ERA
claims were successful, "the argument could prove persuasive to judges in other states
that have ERA in their Constitution." ACLU Tells Massachusetts Court That State
ERA Mandates Medicaid Abortion Funding, Right to Life News, July 21, 1980, at 1;
Britt, In Hawaii Abortionists Cite ERA as Support, Right to Life News, Jan. 1979, at
9.
Fischer v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. 283 C.D. 1981 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Mar. 9,
1984), rehg granted en banc, argued May 1, 1984. held that excluding abortion ser-
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However, doctrine is not the only reason why sex equality claims
have not been asserted in defense of women's abortion rights. Over the
years following Roe v. Wade, women's struggle for control of their bod-
ies has been transformed into debates about medical practice and moral
and religious views of the personhood of the fetus." 6 In the abortion
debate, women's lives and sex-based equality have become distinctly
secondary issues. The decision in Roe v. Wade established the Court as
a single, highly visible target for opponents of abortion. By raising is-
sues of institutional competence, the decision also provided a basis of
opposition to abortion distinct from the merits of reproductive freedom
itself. 117
Abortion is politically controversial, probably much more so than
any other sex equality issue. The ERA, as proposed to the states by the
vices from the otherwise comprehensive Medicaid program violated the equal protection
guarantee of the state constitution. Several other state courts have reached the same
conclusion. In addition the Pennsylvania court held that the exclusion violated the state
ERA.
In Anderson v. Upper Bucks County Area Vocational Technical
School, 30 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 103, 110, 373 A.2d 126, 130 (1977),
this Court held that "since pregnancy is unique to women, a disability
plan which expressly denies benefits for disability arising out of pregnancy
is one which discriminates against women employees because of their
sex."
The Commonwealth argues to us that the indigent women in need of
medically necessary abortions would be in equally bad circumstances if
there were no Medical Assistance program. That argument misses the
mark. There is a Medical Assistance program and once the legislature has
decided to grant financial assistance to the medically needy, it cannot ex-
clude persons from that grant on the basis of sex....
We are of the opinion that while Petitioners' argument under the
ERA is not as strong as their equal protection argument, it is meritorious
and sufficient in and of itself to invalidate the statutes before us in that
those statutes do unlawfully discriminate against women with respect to a
physical condition unique to women.
Id., slip op. at 19-21.
Abortion opponents have also argued that adoption of a federal ERA would man-
date Medicaid funding for abortion. The proponents of the federal ERA reject this
claim. Whether a federal ERA affects abortion depends upon the intentions of the
amendment's proponents, as reflected in the legislative history. See infra note 29.
A sex equality claim in an abortion case was first presented to the Supreme Court
in Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the Committee
for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse and Others at 4-16, City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
116 See, e.g., F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM, & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS (1981).
117 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct.
2481, 2511-12 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976); Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159; Freund,
Storms over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983).
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Congress in 1971, exempted laws governing "physical characteristics,
unique to one sex" from the amendment's proscription, except insofar
as the ERA affected neutral rules that had an oppressive sex-specific
impact.118
To assert that the fourteenth amendment or a state ERA mandates
a concept of sex equality that encompasses a woman's interest in con-
trolling reproductive capacity would inescapably affect the effort to en-
act a federal ERA." 9 Nevertheless, it is important to explore the politi-
cal and legal separation of sex equality and reproductive freedom and
to evaluate the value of a more integrated approach.
This historical overview has identified several reasons for the di-
chotomy between sex equality doctrine and constitutional evaluation of
laws governing reproductive biology. In particular, this doctrinal failure
means that notions of sex equality are irrelevant to the constitutional
rights of pregnant women. The next section of this Article will discuss
how the failure to develop a sex equality doctrine that is more respon-
sive to biological difference has affected the Court's analysis in cases
challenging explicit sex-based classifications.
III. REMOVING BIOLOGY FROM SEX
EQUALITY-ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court has agreed upon "several firmly-established
principles" for analyzing claims that a governmental rule discriminates
on the basis of sex. 20 The constitutional standard employed by the
Court requires that "to withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifi-
cations by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." 2
This "'intermediate' scrutiny, 1 22 first articulated in Craig v. Boren, 1 2
is intended to ensure that governmental classifications are "determined
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical applica-
tion of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles
118 See Brown, ERA Article, supra note 18, at 893-96.
119 See, e.g., statement of Senator DeConcini, quoted infra note 282.
120 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982).
121 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court has also stated that "the
party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender
must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the clas-
sification." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461
(1981)).
122 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982).
123 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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of men and women. ' 24 Such stereotyping is prohibited not only be-
cause it denies opportunities to men and women who are unwilling to
conform to certain social notions of appropriate behavior, but also be-
cause, when enforced, such classifications become "a self-fulfilling
prophecy." '25
But present constitutional equality doctrine does not encompass
concern with laws that regulate real biological difference. This failure
has undermined strong equality analysis in cases challenging explicit
sex-based classifications. The Craig standard, condemning explicit sex
based classifications based on inaccurate stereotypical views of men and
women, collapses when applied to explicit sex-based classifications that
are arguably related to real biological differences. The Supreme Court
has recently considered four such cases in which men presented equal
protection challenges to explicit sex-based classifications that arguably
related to reproductive biology. 2 Each case was decided by a sharply
divided Court, and the analysis in each suffers from a failure to distin-
guish between biological differences and social stereotypes.
A. Unmarried Fathers: Parham, Caban, and Lehr
In Parham v. Hughes,127 Caban v. Mohammed,12 and Lehr v.
Robertson,29 the Court considered the sex equality claims of unmarried
fathers who challenged state laws treating them less favorably than
mothers.1 30 In Parham the father sought to bring a tort claim for the
wrongful death of his child; all mothers were allowed to assert such
claims, but unmarried fathers were not. 31 In Caban the father objected
to the proposed adoption of his children. New York law gave mothers
124 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
125 Id. at 730.
126 Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464 (1981); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes,
441 U.S. 347 (1979).
127 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
126 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
129 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
130 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), also posed an equality claim on behalf
of an unmarried father who challenged the state's action terminating his relationship
with his children. In a move like that used to avoid the early challenges to sex-based
discrimination against pregnant women, see supra note 97-105, the Court evaded the
equality claim by holding that due process requires a hearing prior to termination of
the parent-child relation. The state may not insist on "presuming rather than proving
Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove." Id.
at 658.
131 Under Georgia law a father was allowed to sue for the wrongful death of his
child only if he complied with a state procedure by which men, but not women, could
legitimate their children. Parham, 441 U.S. at 348-49, 355.
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the right to veto an adoption unless they had abandoned the child or
been held unfit, but the unmarried father was given no right to block
the adoption that would terminate his relation with the child."32 In
both cases the fathers had acknowledged, lived with, and supported the
children through their early years. The Court divided five to four in
each case.133 The father in Parham was not allowed to sue for his
child's death, whereas the father in Caban was allowed to block the
adoption of his children. In Lehr a father who had not developed a
relationship with his two-year-old child was denied the opportunity to
protest the adoption by the mother and her new husband. The Court,
dividing six to three, concluded that this distinction between the rights
of unwed mothers" and fathers was constitutional. The dissenters pro-
tested that the father's due process rights had been violated because
state law had denied him the opportunity for review of his interest in
his relationship with the child. 3
In all three cases, the Justices approving the state policies based
their decisions on the ground that the laws accurately reflected biologi-
132 Caban, 441 U.S. at 385-87.
1'3 In both cases Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens voted to uphold the sex discriminatory state policy, and Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmum supported the father's claim. Justice Powell provided the
swing vote, writing the opinion of the Court in Caban and concurring separately in
Parham.
Justice O'Connor has sometimes evidenced noteworthy sympathy for the interests
of unmarried women and their children. In Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982),
the Court unanimously agreed that a one-year statute of limitations for suits to estab-
lish paternity unconstitutionally restricted the rights of illegitimate children. Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court suggested that a four-year limitation might be per-
missible. Justice O'Connor concurred separately to make plain her skepticism that a
four-year limit could be justified:
[I]f, because of the continuing relationship between the natural father and
the mother, the father has provided the child with financial support for
several years, the mother understandably would be unlikely or even un-
willing to jeopardize her relationship with the child's father by filing a
paternity suit in order to protect her child's right to financial support at
some indeterminate future date. Alternatively, the child may have lived
with the father alone or his relatives for a number of years, a situation
that leaves the child obviously unable to sue his father to establish
paternity.
Id. at 105-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Justice O'Connor also noted that:
[tihe unwillingness of the mother to file a paternity action on behalf of her
child, which could stem from her relationship with the natural father or,
as the Court points out, from the emotional strain of having an illegitimate
child, or even from the desire to avoid community and family disapproval,
may continue years after the child is born. The problem may be exacer-
bated if, as often happens, the mother herself is a minor.
Id. at 105 n.4.
I", Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2997-3001 (White, J., dissenting).
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cal differences between men and women. Several of these Justices con-
cluded that because the laws reflected biological differences they were
not subject to intermediate scrutiny. Justice Stewart's plurality opinion
in Parham illustrates the approach.135 In Justice Stewart's view, be-
cause unmarried men and women were not similarly situated in regard
to the law's classification, the state needed only meet the rational rela-
tion test."3 6 The difference between men and women was that "[u]nlike
the mother of an illegitimate child whose identity will rarely be in
doubt, the identity of the father will frequently be unknown. "137 Jus-
tice Stewart expanded on this theme in his dissenting opinion in
Caban: "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. . . . The mother carries and
bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The
validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged by other meas-
ures."' 38 Consequently, the state classification "reflects the physical re-
ality that only the mother carries and gives birth to the child, as well as
the undeniable social reality that the unwed mother is always an identi-
fiable parent and the custodian of the child.""'
In a separate dissent in Caban, Justice Stevens, who is often an
articulate supporter of sex equality, 40 provided the most extensive
statement of the biological justification for this sex-based discrimina-
tion. Analytically, Justice Stevens's approach is very similar to Stew-
art's. For Stevens, the existence of biological differences between men
and women meant that the government should not have the burden of
demonstrating the value and utility of the classification, as it would if
intermediate scrutiny "Were applied.' 4 ' Stevens expanded upon the un-
contestable fact that mothers and fathers have a different relationship to
the child during pregnancy and pointed to social science evidence indi-
cating that "a physical and psychological bond immediately develops
between the [mother and infant] that is not then present between the
Parham, 441 U.S. at 348-59 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.).
138 See id. at 355-56 (stating that men and women are not similarly situated); id.
at 357 (stating that state classification meets rational relation test).
137 Id. at 355. Apparently Justice Stewart thought it was also relevant that the
state allowed men but not women to legitimate a child by unilateral action. See id. As
Justice White pointed out in his dissent, however, this statutory distinction, which may
itself be unconstitutional, can hardly justify a conclusion that men and women are not
similarly situated. See-id. at 361 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
138 Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
189 Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
140 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ca-
rey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 429 U.S. 125
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Caban, 441 U.S. at 409-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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infant and the father or any other person." '142 He then claimed that:
differences [between the mother and father] continue at birth
and immediately thereafter. During that period, the mother
and child are together; the mother's identity is known with
certainty. The father, on the other hand, may or may not be
present; his identity may be unknown to the world and may
even be uncertain to the mother. These natural differences
between unmarried fathers and mothers make it probable
that the mother, and not the father or both parents, will have
custody of the newborn infant.
In short, it is virtually inevitable that from conception
through infancy the mother will constantly be faced with de-
cisions about how best to care for the child, whereas it is
much less certain that the father will be confronted with
comparable problems. 43
To give the father a right to veto the adoption of his child would "re-
move the mother's freedom of choice in her own and the child's behalf
without also relieving her of the unshakable responsibility for the care
of the child."144 In contrast to this view of the mother's "unshakable
responsibility" for the child, in Lehr Justice Stevens described the fa-
ther's relation with his child, suggesting that
[t]he significance of the biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of respon-
sibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of
the parent-child relationship .... ""
The assertion of these "natural" differences between men and
women is not simply an attempt by the Justices to avoid a higher level
of scrutiny of the classification. For example, Justice Powell, who con-
curred in the result in Parham and thereby provided the decisive vote
upholding the state's wrongful death rule, found the differences be-
tween a mother and father to be relevant when he applied the higher,
intermediate standard to the classification. He concluded that the differ-
ential treatment of the father was permissible because "[t]he marginally
142 Caban, 441 U.S. at 405 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens begins
his argument with the recognition that "both parents are equally responsible for the
conception of the child out of wedlock." Id. at 404.
143 Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
I'l Id. at 408 (emphasis added).
145 Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2993.
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greater burden placed upon fathers is no more severe than is required
by the marked difference between proving paternity and proving mater-
nity." '146 However, the classification in Caban did not withstand Pow-
ell's intermediate scrutiny because there was less difficulty in proving
paternity in the adoption context.
147
The approach to gender discrimination in these cases is a striking
illustration of how the Court's equal protection paradigm actually es-
tablishes few limitations on the government's ability to establish gender
classifications. More importantly, the facts of the cases reveal the inac-
curacy of the stereotypes asserted by the various Justices as "biological
fact." There was no doubt as to the identity of these fathers. In Caban,
the parents lived together for five years, until the youngest child was
almost three. When the mother left, with the children, the father con-
tinued to visit them for nine months at which time the children left both
parents to live with the maternal grandmother in Puerto Rico. The
children stayed there for one year and both parents communicated with
them by mail. Then the father went to Puerto Rico, where the grand-
mother "willingly surrendered the children" to him, with the under-
standing they would be returned in a few days. He took them back to
New York with him. The mother sought and obtained a temporary
custody order. Both parents, with their new spouses, then filed cross
petitions to adopt the children.148 During the eight years from the time
the parents began living together until the filing of the conflicting adop-
tion claims, with the exception of the nine months when the children
lived with their mother and regularly visited their father, nothing in the
record indicates that either parent was more responsible for the care,
nurture, and support of the children. In Parham all that we know
about the father whose child was killed is that he signed the birth cer-
tificate, provided support, and visited his child on a regular basis.1 49
We know nothing about the mother, except that she and the child were
in the same car when they were killed. 50 In Lehr, the parents lived
146 Parham, 441 U.S. at 360 (Powell, J., concurring).
142 Responding to the presumption established by the Georgia state statute that
the roles of parents differ, Justice Powell noted, "Maternal and paternal roles are not
invariably different in importance. Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than
unwed fathers to their newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child re-
lations would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of
the child increased." Id. at 389. Justice Powell later expanded on the changing nature
of the father's relation to the child: "Even if the special difficulties attendant upon
locating and identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify a legislative distinction
between mothers and fathers of newborns, these difficulties need not persist past in-
fancy." Id. at 392.
148 Caban, 441 U.S. at 382-84.
'4 See Parham, 441 U.S. at 349.
180 See id.; see also Hughes v. Parham, 241 Ga. 198, 243 S.E.2d 867 (1978)
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together for two years prior to the child's birth. The father visited the
mother and child in the hospital. Upon leaving the hospital with the
child, the mother concealed her whereabouts from him. He diligently
searched for them and eventually found them with the aid of a private
investigator."" Finally, he filed a petition in court to establish paternity
of the child, before being advised of the pending adoption proceeding.
One of the core infirmities of sex-based classifications is that they
are unjust in relation to individuals who do not fit the stereotypes. 52 In
these cases the stereotype of the absent, unknown, irresponsible father
was simply false.
The stereotype of the mother's "unshakable responsibility for the
care of the child," facing the "virtually inevitable" need to make deci-
sions for her child, is also sometimes inaccurate. Significant numbers of
women place their children for adoption at or prior to birth. 3 It is not
unheard of for a woman, after giving birth, to simply walk away, leav-
ing the baby to the care of others. How then is it "virtually inevitable
that . . . the mother will constantly be faced with decisions about how
best to care for the child" ?154 She can, and sometimes does, make only
one decision-to leave.
Justice Stevens in Caban attempts to answer the claim that the
sex-based presumption of the New York adoption law is unjust as ap-
plied to the individual father who had assumed responsibility for his
children.
If we assume, as we surely must, that characteristics pos-
sessed by all members of one class and by no members of the
other class justify some disparate treatment of mothers and
fathers of children born out of wedlock, the mere fact that
the statute draws a "gender-based distinction," . . . should
not, in my opinion, give rise to any presumption that the
impartiality principle embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause has been violated. Indeed, if we make the further un-
disputed assumption that the discrimination is justified in
those cases in which the rule has its most frequent applica-
tion-cases involving newborn infants and very young chil-
(Georgia Supreme Court opinion below).
Parham was not litigated as a test case. No amicus briefs were filed by either
children's rights or women's rights organizations. 441 U.S. at 348. By contrast, the
father's claim in Caban was supported by the ACLU, Community Action for Legal
Services, and the Legal Aid Society as amicus. 441 U.S. at 381.
'I Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2997.
15 See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
1 See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S. at 404 n.7.
154 Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
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dren in the custody of their natural mothers-we should pre-
sume that the law is entirely valid and require the challenger
to demonstrate that its unjust applications are sufficiently
numerous and serious to render it invalid.155
It is quite unclear what is meant by "characteristics possessed by
all members of one class." Certainly it is not universally true that
women assume responsibility for the care of infants at birth and men
do not. Justice Steven's suggestion that sex-based discrimination is jus-
tifiable when it reflects prevailing social patterns is familiar. The Court
has long held that "the rules of civil society must be adopted to the
general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional
cases." 15 That language is from Mr. Justice Bradley's classic defense
of the natural subordination of women in Bradwell v. Illinois.
5 7
15 Id. at 409-10 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
... Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
157 Id. The Parham majority, in addition to relying on the biological difference
between "proving paternity and proving maternity," upheld the Georgia law denying
unmarried fathers the right to sue for the wrongful death of their child as one discrimi-
natory part of a larger discriminatory whole. Georgia law provided a process by which
unmarried fathers, but not unmarried mothers, could legitimate their children. This
larger discriminatory whole justified the particular discriminatory part. 441 U.S. at
354-56.
The Court does not always get trapped in this circle, in which one discriminatory
policy justifies another. For example, in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), the state
attempted to defend its rule providing alimony only to women, arguing that the provi-
sion of alimony was a form of compensation for the married woman whose property
became her husband's at common law. In striking down the statute as violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Court said,
This argument, that the "support obligation was imposed by the common
law to compensate the wife for the discrimination she suffered at the
hands of the common law," ... reveals its own weakness. At most it
establishes that the alimony statutes were part and parcel of a larger stat-
utory scheme which invidiously discriminated against women, removing
them from the world of work and property and "compensating" them by
making their designated place "secure." This would be reason to invali-
date the entire discriminatory scheme-not a reason to uphold its separate
invidious parts.
440 U.S. at 279 n.9.
In Parham it seems that the Court adopted the circular logic because of a lack of
clear focus on the myth and reality of sex-based biological difference.
Apart from classifications touching upon biological difference, the other area in
which the Court has allowed a larger sex discriminatory whole to justify a particular
sex discriminatory part is in classifications affecting military service. See Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 198 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
In the military cases the Court has relied upon the fact that women are excluded
from most combat positions to justify allowing them more time to prove their worth for
promotion (Schlesinger) and to justify the exclusion of women from draft registration
(Rostker). The Court has not been presented with a case challenging the exclusion from
combat. See Goodman, Women, War and Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimi-
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Although sex-based classifications are unjust in relation to indivi-
duals, like the fathers in Caban and Parham or the woman in
Bradwell who do not fit the stereotypes imposed on them, the primary
constitutional infirmity in such classifications is not that they are inac-
curate, but rather that they are self-fulfilling. The stereotype of women
accepting the "unshakable responsibility for the care of the child" is
overwhelmingly accurate.15 Most women do take responsibility for
nation in the Military, 5 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RE. 243 (1979) (discussing the over-
breadth of the combat exclusion and the damage it does to women in the military); see
also Williams, supra note 199.
18 For example, although Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is
available to any needy parent or other single caretaker of a minor child, over 98% of
the families receiving AFDC are headed by women. The percentage of AFDC families
consisting of a man and children has remained relatively constant over recent years,
ranging from a low of 1.2% in 1973 to a high of 1.6% in 1977. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1979, at
357.
For another example, a 1981 report by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission found
that "a substantial number of women, especially minority women, are prevented from
taking paid work because of unavailable or inadequate child care." U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, CHILD CARE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN 9 (1981). Ap-
proximately one of every five unemployed women is unable to work because she cannot
make satisfactory child care arrangements. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CHILDREN
AND PRESCHOOL: OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT 47 (1978). A recent analysis of
national survey data shows that 23% of single and married working mothers find that
breakdowns in child care arrangements cause them to be late for or absent from work.
Almost no fathers reported such problems. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
POLICY, EVALUATION, AND RESEARCH, DEP'T OF LABOR, WORK AND FAMILY LIFE:
FIRST REPORTS ON WORK-FAMILY INTERFERENCE AND WORKERS' FORMAL CHILD
CARE ARRANGEMENTS FROM THE 1977 QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT SURVEY, 1978,
table.
Women do most of the work of homemaking and child care even when two par-
ents are in the home. One study shows that, on the average, the hours women devote to
such work varies from 28 hours per week for women with no children who are em-
ployed at full time wage labor to 84 hours a weeks for women with seven or more
children who are not also doing wage work. Men spend an average of 10.5 hours a
week on housework and childcare, and there is little variation in male contribution
when the woman is employed outside the home. Walker and Gauger, The Dollar
Value of Household Work, NYS SCHOOL OF HUMAN ECOLOGY, INFORMATION BULL.
60 (1973); see also A. OAKLEY, THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOUSEWORK (1974).
When married couples separate, the woman takes custody of the children about
90% of the time, most often by mutual agreement of the parties. M. WHEELER, DI-
VIDED CHILDREN: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR DIVORCING PARENTS 40 (1980). When it is
contested, men succeed in obtaining custody in more than half the cases. Pollikoff, Gen-
der and Child-Custody Determninations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE, 183, 184
(I. Diamond ed. 1983) Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 335, 335 n.3 (1982); Orthner and Lewis, Evidence of Single-Father Competence
in Childrearing, 13 FAM. L. Q. 27 (1979); Weitzman and Dixon, Child Custody
Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support, and
Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 473 (1979).
Despite profound changes in the status of women in the past 15 years, women still
do most of the work in the home. Blumstein and Schwartz, AMERICAN COUPLES 144-
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their children, often against terrible obstacles, sacrificing their own in-
terests to their children's needs every day, in large matters and small.
And it is a very good thing for children that they do. John MacMurray
observes,
The baby must be fitted by nature at birth to the conditions
into which he [sic] is born; for otherwise he could not sur-
vive. He is, in fact, "adapted" to a complete dependence
upon an adult human being. He is made to be cared for...
not merely his personal development, but his very survival
depends upon the maintaining of this relation . . . . He
cannot live at all by any initiative, whether personal or or-
ganic, of his own. He can live only through other people and
in dynamic relation with them.19
Although it is critical for children that someone assume responsibility
for them, that response is not determined by biology. The Court asserts
that, for men, parenthood is an "opportunity" for nurturing.6 So too
for women. But caring for the children that we parent, and for the ones
that we don't, is more than an opportunity, it is also a responsibility.
Biology does not determine who cares for a child after birth. When the
Supreme Court assumes it does, the Court confuses biology with social
patterns and sex-based stereotypes.
In taking responsibility for children women act as independent
moral agents. When the Supreme Court assumes that "biology" dic-
tates that women care for infants, it is impossible to attach moral value
to the woman's actions or to acknowledge the human and social worth
of the nurturing that women do. When the Court allows sex-based
classifications to be justified by the presumption that fathers are un-
identified, absent, and irresponsible, it is more likely that these general-
izations will continue to be true. Assertions that it is "virtually inevita-
ble" that the mother will care for the child, assumptions of her
"unshakable responsibility" and the "undeniable social reality that...
the mother is always . . . the custodian of the child," are no different
from the "old notion" that motherhood is "the nobel and benign mis-
sion" of women. 61 The assumption reinforces stereotypes and degrades
women.
The stereotype of male irresponsibility in relation to the children
46 (1983).
159 J. MACMURRY, PERSONS IN RELATION 48-51 (1961).
e Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2293 (1983).
..1 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872).
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they father is also distressingly accurate.16 2 It is a core social problem
of our time.163 The problems created by men who fail to provide their
children financial support are widely recognized, 164 as are the problems
facing women who cannot achieve equality in wage work or public life
while doing the work essential to meet the needs of children.165 When
the Court upholds a statutory scheme because it considers fatherhood
solely in terms of "opportunity," and motherhood in terms of "unshak-
able responsibility," it reinforces stereotypes and perpetuates male
irresponsibility.
In addition to reinforcing stereotypes, legal cognizance of these
gender "differences" has an impact on child custody litigation:
Case analysis reveals a tendency to overrate small paternal
contributions to parenting because they are still so noticea-
ble, and to concomitantly over-emphasize lack of total mater-
nal parenting. In other words, the emphasis in evaluating
mothers is on what they do not do, because they are expected
to do everything. By this standard, men will always look
good for doing more than nothing and women will always
look bad for doing less than everything.166
But men's lack of concrete connection with the young raises other,
even more serious, problems. Nurturing children-helping the next
generation to stand on our shoulders-is one of the most noble tasks of
any civilization. Yet few men ever have substantial day-to-day experi-
ence with young children. It seems plausible that intense relationships
with young children encourage reverence for the future of the species
and the planet. It is deeply disturbing that so few men experience such
162 A majority of fathers of all income levels substantially fail to comply with
orders requiring that they support their children. See J. CASSETrY, CHILD SUPPORT
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1978); D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979); Cham-
bers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614
(1982).
For an excellent analysis of the reasons underlying the failure to enforce child
support, see Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs
on Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1983).
163 D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 33; N. CHODOROW, supra note 33.
164 See supra note 162; see also Locker, Enforcement of Child Support Obligations
of Absent Parents-Social Services Amendments of 1974, 30 Sw. L.J. 625 (1976);
Mnookin, Review: Using Jail for Child Support Enforcement, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 338
(1981).
165 See supra note 158.
166 Polikoff, Gender and Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in
FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND
THE STATE, 183, 191 (I. Diamond ed. 1983). See also Polikoff, Why Are Mothers
Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 240-41 (1983).
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relationships, particularly those men who exercise the greatest power in
government, business, and education.
Another problem is the effect of absent fathers on children. A
broad spectrum of people-feminists, the Catholic Church, Freudi-
ans-believes that the early years of a child's life are critical in deter-
mining human potential. Adults today were almost all nurtured solely
by women, particularly when they were very young. The love and hate
we feel for the person who cared for us when we were totally vulnera-
ble and dependent is directed exclusively at women. The phenomenon
of exclusive female nurturing of the young has a profound influence on
the people that we are, and will be. Children would grow to be differ-
ent, perhaps stronger, adults if men were involved in their early
nurturing. 167
B. Statutory Rape: Michael M.
The fourth Supreme Court case involving a sex-based classifica-
tion justified in relation to biological difference was Michael M. v. Su-
perior Court,6 8 which upheld a California statutory rape law making
it a crime for a man to have sex with a woman under the age of eight-
een. Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion reflects a belief that women
and men are different in ways that are relevant to the state's
classification:
Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer dispro-
portionately the profound physical, emotional, and psycho-
logical consequences of sexual activity ...
Because virtually all of the significant harmful and in-
escapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall
on the young female, a legislature acts well within its au-
thority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by
nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct."6 9
' "[Exclusive single parenting is bad for mother and child alike .... [M]others
in such a setting are liable to overinvest in and overwhelm the relationship. Similarly, I
think, children are better off in situations where love and relationship are not a scarce
resource controlled and manipulated by one person only." N. CHODOROW, supra note
33 at -. See also supra note 33. For a similar analysis of the effects of exclusively
female mothering, see D. DINNESTEIN, supra note 33, at 33-34, 41-82, especially 71-
72.
In suggesting a need for greater male involvement in the nurture of children, I do
not mean to deny the legitimacy of mother-child families. Most children today are nur-
tured by women, including children in conventional heterosexual two-parent homes.
le8 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
169 Id. at 471-73 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
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Rehnquist's opinion never actually stated, however, whether these
differences mean that this is not an appropriate case in which to apply
the Craig standard. Based on the assumption that prevention of teenage
pregnancy was the purpose of the sex-based classification, 17 0 Rehnquist
concluded only that the law was "sufficiently related to the State's
objectives to pass constitutional muster. 17 1 In any event, the perceived
differences between men and women were crucial to the opinion.
17 2
The precise contours of the analysis in Justice Blackmun's concur-
ring opinion are even more obscure. His assessment of the presence and
impact of gender differences is simply not included in the opinion.1 73
As in the three cases discussed earlier, the Michael M. plurality
does not evaluate with care the gender differences upon which it relies
in upholding the state law. This failure of analysis means that the plu-
rality also mistakes stereotype for biology. In fact, it is not entirely na-
ture that imposes upon women the devastating burdens of teenage preg-
170 See id. at 470.
17 Id. at 473.
172 Justice Stewart, concurring, also relied upon biological difference to justify the
sex-based classification. "The risk of pregnancy is a significant deterrent for unwed
young females that is not shared by unmarried males, regardless of their age. Expe-
rienced observation confirms the commonsense notion that adolescent males disregard
the possibility of pregnancy far more than do adolescent females." Id. at 480.
173 Justice Blackmun's assessment of the conduct at issue in Michael M. is in-
cluded, however, and that assessment is disturbing. Justice Blackmun provides exten-
sive quotes from Sharon's testimony at the preliminary hearing. See id. at 483-88 n.*.
Sharon and Michael met at a bus stop the night the intercourse took place. Sharon and
an older sister were slightly drunk, waiting for a bus about midnight. Michael and two
other boys picked them up, and the five drank some more. Sharon and Michael began
kissing and separated from the others. Sharon asked Michael to slow down, told him
she did not want to have intercourse, and "let him do what he wanted" only after he
hit her several times, causing bruises to her face. Id. at 483-85 n.*. Justice Blackmun
characterized the facts, by saying,
that Michael and Sharon's nonacquaintance with each other before the
incident; their drinking; their withdrawal from the others of the group;
their foreplay, in which she willingly participated and seems to have en-
couraged; and the closeness of their ages (a difference of only one year and
18 days) are factors that should make this case an unattractive one to
prosecute at all, and especially to prosecute as a felony . . . .But ...
the facts, I reluctantly conclude, may fit the crime.
Id. at 483-87.
Frances Olsen observes that "Blackmun's reaction would seem to be that Sharon
did not fit the 'chaste and naive' image. . . . [He] endorses the double standard of
sexual morality, in which men may aggress sexually against one class of females but
must leave the higher class chaste. Since Michael did not transgress this rule, it is not
fair to him to bring a felony prosecution." Olsen, Towards a New Feminist Jurispru-
dence: The Case of Statutory Rape, TEX. L. Rlv. text at note 118 (1984). She charac-
terizes the transcript as "an indictment of the warped human relations that take place
in a gender-stratified society. . . .The testimony captures the confused yearnings for
closeness and the frustrated anger that can make adolesence so painful a time-for both
females and males-in our society." Id. at n.212.
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nancy; the social and legal ethos that makes women solely responsible
for nurturing the children they bear also plays a part. Justice Rehn-
quist asserts that "the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial
deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter
males."" 4 Of course, men are not deterred because fatherhood is now
only an "opportunity" not a responsibility; men are not morally ac-
countable to their children. That is simply "nature," the way things
are, and the state is free to recognize this biological "reality." The pre-
sumptions underlying Justice Rehnquist's assertions are appalling.
They inescapably reinforce the legitimacy of male irresponsibility in
relation to their children. They also prevent us from seeing that women
are people who make moral choices and from valuing the nurturing
choices women make.
Michael M. also accepts and reinforces the sex-based stereotypes
that men are naturally, biologically aggressive in relation to sex, while
women are sexually passive, and that young women need the law's pro-
tection from their own weakness.' 75 In sex, the man is the offender and
the woman the victim.1 76 The social problem of male aggression, both
generally1 7 7 and in relation to sex,1 78 cannot be understated. The social
problem of female passivity is more subtle but nonetheless real. When
the Court acts on the assumption that these stereotypes are natural,
biological, and inalterable, it reinforces and perpetuates the stereotypes.
17" Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473.
I'5 The protection of the chastity of young girls was seen as the purpose of the
statutory rape law until the Michael M. litigation. See id. at 495-96 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
171 Justice Rehnquist uses the terms "offender" and "victim" when describing
how the California Supreme Court had justified the statutory rape law. See id. at 467
(plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
117 FBI statistics show that males are much more likely to be arrested for violent
crimes than are females. For murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 87.3% of the
arrests were males; for aggravated assault, 87.4% were males; and for robbery, 92.8%
were males. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1981
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 178 (1982).
78 Forcible rape accounts for 6% of reported violent crimes against people in the
United States. National statistics show that in 1980 reported forcible rape offenses were
up 8% over 1979 figures and up 45% over 1976 figures. "Even with the advent of rape
crisis centers and an improved awareness by police dealing with rape victims, forcible
rape, a violent crime against the person, is still recognized as one of the most underre-
ported of all Index crimes." FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1980 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 15 (1981).
A random study of 4,000 American women in the early 1950's revealed that 24%
had experienced a sexual encounter with an adult prior to age 13. A. KINSEY, W.
POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE
117 (1953). This and a variety of other studies suggest that in 80 to 90% of cases a man
is the offender. F. RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 2-4
(1980). Another investigator finds that 97% of incest offenders are male. See L.
SCHIRHART, THE SILENT CHILDREN 195 (1980).
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Michael M. also accepts and reinforces the sex-based stereotype
that young men may legitimately engage in sexual activity and young
women may not. As Professor Frances Olsen has observed, under the
California law a young man is free to be sexual as long as he chooses a
partner who is older than eighteen, while a young woman may not
legally have sex with anyone, except her husband if she is married.
17
1
These sex-differentiated assumptions about the legitimacy of sexual ex-
pression are so ingrained that the plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions ignored them.
A statutory rape law may well be a reasonable device for protect-
ing relatively powerless people from coercion exerted by those who are
relatively more powerful, and age might reasonably serve as a proxy
for power. But the California law "protects" young women from heter-
osexual intercourse with men of any age, while not offering similar
protection to young men. By penalizing men, but not women, who have
sex with young people, it denies the possibility of female sexuality.
Again, none of the Court's opinions discussed this sex-based
differentiation.
These cases illustrate more than the Court's consistent confusion
of biology with the social consequences of biology. They also demon-
strate the breakdown in current sex equality doctrine that occurs when
the Court reviews a classification that, in its view, is based upon biolog-
ical differences. In such cases it is likely that the Court will either (1)
defer to the governmental body that adopted the rule, requiring only
that a rational relation test be met, or (2) apply the Craig test in form
only, in either case, adjusting its review to account for what it under-
stands to be the real difference between the sexes.180
179 See Olsen, supra note 173; supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
o The failure of the Court to subject biological classifications to careful scrutiny
by considering whether sex-neutral statutes would achieve the state's purpose can be
seen in the application of the test in the cases just discussed. In the three cases that
considered the rights of unwed fathers, the state could have provided that any parent
who abandoned a child without justification or excuse would have no right to object to
the adoption. For example, Justice Powell found in Caban that
where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of
the child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State from
withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of the child.
Indeed, under the statute as it now stands the surrogate may proceed in
the absence of consent when the parent whose consent otherwise would be
required never has come forward or has abandoned the child.
441 U.S. at 392 (footnote omitted).
The standard the Court articulates in Lehr is consistent with this approach: "If
one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent
has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause
does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal rights." 103 S.
Ct. at 2996-97 (footnotes omitted). Establishing a gender-neutral rule would still allow
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The results in Parham and Michael M., as well as the analysis in
all four cases, might have been different had the Court perceived the
distinction between laws based on sex and laws based on sex-specific
biology and had it recognized that laws governing reproductive biology
also implicate equality concerns and demand careful scrutiny. The next
section will attempt to identify a new test for classifications based on
biological differences.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO SEX-BASED EQUALITY AND
BIOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
Before proposing a new approach to classifications based on bio-
logical differences, it is useful to identify initially how such classifica-
tions would be evaluated under several alternative approaches to sex
equality. Once the advantages and limitations of these approaches are
outlined, a more coherent approach will be charted.
for prompt settlement of adoption proceedings by avoiding hard questions of proof.
Unless the father is on the scene and provides material support or communicates a good
excuse for his absence at the time of birth, he can sensibly be held to have abandoned
his child. We would not hesitate to apply exactly the same rule to the mother who left
the hospital without her infant and stayed away for more than a very brief period. The
needs of infants are such that anything less than constant attention quickly becomes
abandonment. The man who seeks the company of an infant, provides the intensive
support, care, and nurturance that infants demand and then claims, without reasonable
basis, that he is the father would be very rare.
If we assume that the purpose of the statute in Michael M. was to prevent teenage
sex and pregnancies, a sex-neutral statute again would have allowed the state to meet
its interest equally effectively. Many states have adopted neutral statutes prohibiting
sex with minors. The sex-based statute of Michael M., far from serving important state
interests, was probably a less effective deterrent to teenage sex than the neutral alterna-
tives. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 493-94 and nn.7-8 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at
498-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If, on the other hand, California had been seeking to protect young and relatively
powerless people from sexual relationships with older and relatively more powerful
people, it could have made it a crime for any adult to have sex with a child under a
fixed age or with a child who is more than a fixed number of years younger than the
adult. Or, if the legislature also wanted to prohibit sexual relationships among teenag-
ers, it could have penalized all teenagers who engaged in sexual activities.
There is certainly a distinction between a desire to protect vulnerable teenagers
from coercive sexual relations with older people and a desire to prohibit all sexual
activity by teenagers. If we want to protect vulnerable young people, we should not
subject them to prosecution. Justices Stevens and Brennan, dissenting in Michael M.,
suggested approval of a sex neutral law under which both parties would be subject to
prosecution. Stevens refers to the California statute as "exempt[ing] 50% of the poten-
tial violators," id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Brennan argues that under a
"gender-neutral law" twice as many persons would be "subject to arrest," id. at 494
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters' version of sex-neutrality demands that vul-
nerable teenagers incriminate themselves in order to claim the law's protection against
coerced sex.
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A. Understanding Biological Differences According to Current
Notions of Sex-Based Equality
It is possible to construct a constitutional sex equality concept in
which laws governing sex-specific physical characteristics will have one
of the following three implications: (1) the laws raise no concerns about
sex equality; (2) the laws are considered in the same way as laws that
classify explicitly on the basis of sex; and (3) the laws are considered
under a reconceptuaized idea of equality that applies a new, integrated
test to any sex-related classification.
The first approach is essentially the Supreme Court's notion of sex
equality-one in which laws governing reproductive biology raise no
sex equality concerns."81 As the Court stated in Geduldig v. Aiello,
182
for example, "[W]hile it is true that only women can become pregnant
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg-
nancy is a sex-based classification." 8 ' This approach clearly denies the
core reality that sex-based biological differences are related to sex. It is
not easy to reconcile the ideal of sex-based equality with the reality of
categorical biological difference, but the difficulty is not overcome by
denying that laws governing reproductive biology are sex based. Fur-
ther, because, as we have seen, it is easy for the Court to confuse real
categorical biological differences with sex-based differences that are cul-
turally imposed, an equality doctrine that exempts laws based on real
physical differences from its concern is likely to be a weak one. Finally,
and most importantly, in a society constitutionally committed to equal-
ity, the reality of biological difference in relation to reproduction should
not be permitted to justify state action exaggerating the consequences of
those differences. This is what happens when those actions escape scru-
tiny by courts.
The second approach to reconciling the ideal of equality with the
reality of biological difference scrutinizes laws regulating reproductive
differences in the same manner as laws that include explicit sex-based
classifications using the Court's current gender-discrimination stan-
dard.1 8 This approach has the virtue of simplicity. It recognizes that
181 See, e.g., supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
182 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
183 Id. at 496 n.20.
184 For example, Justice Brennan has argued that "dissimilar treatment of men
and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevi-
tably constitutes sex discrimination." Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). He criticized the Geduldig majority for failing to explain "what differentiates the
gender-based classification employed in this case from those found unconstitutional in
Reed and Frontiero." Id. at 503.
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laws based on sex-specific physical characteristics are related to sex and
avoids the need to distinguish between these two types of sex-based
laws.
The difficulty with this approach is that a central justification for
limiting the use of explicit sex-based classifications is that they are not
related to real differences between men and women. By contrast, laws
governing reproductive characteristics, such as those prohibiting abor-
tion or providing nutritional supplements for pregnant women,8 5 may
be precisely related to the individual characteristics of the people they
identify. The prevailing sex equality standard determines whether the
sex-based classification at issue actually is responsive to real differences
between men and women and rejects classifications when there are no
such differences. This standard usually works in relation to explicit
sex-based classifications because individual men and women escape
stereotypical sex roles.18 The escapees disprove the judgment about
men and women that motivated the explicit sex-based classification.
However, because there are no escapees from biology, no pregnant
men, or women sperm donors, a standard focusing solely on compara-
tive equality does not provide a helpful tool for evaluating laws gov-
erning ways in which men and women categorically, biologically differ.
This second approach is also troubling because of a related con-
cern. As a practical matter, it is difficult to maintain an appropriately
rigorous standard for evaluating the cultural restraints of explicit sex-
based classifications if the same standard is also used to judge laws
185 The Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant Program under Title V
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (Supp. V 1981), provides grants and
aid to state health departments for certain health services. The program has two com-
ponents: (1) health services for maternity, delivery and preventive infant health care;
and (2) crippled children's services. States have used some of the funds for pre-natal
and well-baby clinics.
The Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC), see 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (Supp. V. 1981), is a food supplement program that is
targeted to pregnant and lactating women, infants, and young children. To qualify, the
family must have an inadequate income and the individual must be a nutritional risk.
Income eligibility guidelines are set by the Secretary of Agriculture and the nutritional
risk category must be certified by a competent professional authority. The program
provides nutritional supplements through vouchers or food packages as well as some
preventive health care, educational programs, and referrals.
188 Under Title VII, the Court has held that explicit sex-based classifications can-
not be used, even where they describe statistically accurate differences between men and
women because Title VII's "focus on the individual isunambiguous." City of Los An-
geles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978), reaffirmed in
Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983).
Under the fourteenth amendment the Court has invalidated sex-based classifica-
tions, even where they rest on "predictive empirical relationships" that are more or less
accurate in the aggregate. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 (1976).
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governing sex-specific physical characteristics. Similarly, we have al-
ready seen how the Supreme Court's current intermediate scrutiny may
become much more deferential when the Court perceives that a rule is
based on "real" differences between the sexes.187 A better approach
would consider laws based on biological differences independently of
laws employing categorical sex-based classifications, thereby reducing
the Court's ability to distort its intermediate scrutiny in this way.
The final approach, as advocated by Professor Catherine MacKin-
non, attempts to grapple with the pervasive totality of sex-based op-
pression. She describes sex discrimination as a systematic construct that
defines women as inferior to men and "that cumulatively disadvantages
women for their differences from men, as well as ignores their similari-
ties." '188 She urges a constitutional equality standard that would ask
simply "whether the policy or practice in question integrally contrib-
utes to the maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because
of gender status." '
Professor MacKinnon's approach is ambitious, but it adds unnec-
essary complexity to the application of sex equality doctrine in a large
number of cases. The determination of what reinforces or undermines a
sex-based underclass is 'exceedingly difficult. Professor MacKinnon
may overestimate judges' capacities to identify and avoid socially im-
posed constraints on equality.1 " She disregards our history in which
laws justified as protecting women have been a central means of op-
pressing them. 91 Most fundamentally, her proposed standard may in-
corporate and perpetuate a false belief that a judicially enforced consti-
tutional standard can, by itself, dismantle the deep structures that
"integrally contribute" to sex-based deprivation. 92
MacKinnon discusses how sex equality doctrine can focus on an
analysis of either "differences" between sexes (current doctrine) 93 or
"inequality" (her proposed doctrine). 9 ' MacKinnon correctly contends
that under current gender doctrine, "[i]f the sexes can be considered
relevantly the same, 'similarly situated,' or comparable on the dimen-
sion in question, differential treatment may be discriminatory; if not,
differential treatment merely treats differences differently and is not
a8 See, e.g., supra notes 146-47 & 181 and accompanying text.
's See C. MAcKiNNON, supra note 41, at 116.
189 Id. at 117.
190 See generally Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and
the Role of Law, in THE POLMcS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
'91 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
19' See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
193 See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 41, at 101-02.
194 See id. at 102-03.
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discriminatory." '1 95 We have seen, and MacKinnon herself argues, that
this comparative analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no sex
discrimination when a law is based on real biological differences be-
tween men and women.19 Notwithstanding this important limitation of
current equality doctrine, broad use of
an inequality approach poses tremendous risks. The very in-
visibility of discrimination against women makes it unlikely
that the inequality approach can in fact be utilized success-
fully by litigators before the present judiciary. When, as in
Califano v. Goldfarb, . . . a majority of the Court cannot
agree that women are discriminated against by a system of
social security benefits that provides greater coverage for the
dependents of male workers than it does for the dependents
of female workers, there are great dangers in pressing a view
that subjects discrimination against women to more exacting
scrutiny than it does discrimination against men. It is all too
likely that the courts will simply uphold the discrimination
because they fail to see that women have been disadvantaged.
Moreover, as MacKinnon herself acknowledges, "woman's
'specialness' (is) the cornerstone of that separate-but-equal
logic of complementarity that has assigned her those pursuits
and those qualities that are glorified as female but deni-
grated as human ... "'
MacKinnon's proposal is mistaken, therefore, because it would re-
quire a search for hierarchy when only a search for difference may be
necessary. Her approach is helpful, however, because it provides a
framework for determining when a rule classifying on the basis of bio-
logical differences is actually discriminating on the basis of sex. Such a
rule is discriminatory when it "integrally contributes to the mainte-
nance of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender
status."1 98
The three approaches discussed above unsuccessfully confront the
unique problem of evaluating laws based on biological differences. In
articulating a new standard for evaluating such laws, I hope to incorpo-
rate the strengths while avoiding the weaknesses of these approaches.
'95 Id. at 110. See also id. at 102 ("The gender difference is lined up against the
sex difference in practice, and women are compared with men, to see if the correspon-
dences warrant the application.").
198 See id. at 104-05.
197 Taub, Book Review: Sexual Harrassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686, 1691 (1980) (citation omitted).
'98 C. MAcKINNON, supra note 41, at 117.
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B. A New Approach to Laws Based on Biological Differences
Professor Wendy Williams observes, "The instinct to treat preg-
nancy as a special case is deeply imbedded in our culture, indeed in
every culture. It seems natural, and right, to treat it that way." '99 Yet,
this wise feminist and constitutional scholar urges that we resist the
temptation to see pregnancy as unique. She argues that
[c]onceptualizing pregnancy as a special case permits unfa-
vorable as well as favorable treatment of pregnancy ...
[T]he same doctrinal approach that permits pregnancy to be
treated worse than other disabilities is the same one that will
allow the state constitutional freedom to create special bene-
fits for pregnant women. . . . If we can't have it both ways,
we need to think carefully about which way we want to have
it. 2
00
But pregnancy, abortion, reproduction, and creation of another
human being are special-very special. Women have these experiences.
Men do not. An equality doctrine that ignores the unique quality of
these experiences implicitly says that women can claim equality only
insofar as they are like men. Such a doctrine demands that women deny
an important aspect of who they are. Such a doctrine is, to say the
least, reified. 21 Further, deny as we might, the reality remains that
only women experience pregnancy. If women are to achieve fully equal
status in American society, including a sharing of power traditionally
held by men, and retain control of their bodies, our understanding of
sex equality must encompass a strong constitutional equality guarantee
that requires "radically increasing the options available to each individ-
ual, and more importantly, allowing the human personality to break
out of the present dichotomized system. "202
Because of the unique equality concerns raised by biological differ-
ences, sex equality doctrine must distinguish between laws drawing ex-
plicit sex-based lines and laws governing reproductive biology. Al-
though both types of laws raise sex equality issues, the grounds for
concern are different. The problem posed by laws that classify explic-
itly on the basis of sex is that sex, as a proxy for some functional char-
acteristic, is often inaccurate in relation to particular individuals. More
Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Femn-
inism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175, 195 (1982).
200 Id.
201 Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOL-
OGY (S. Spitzer ed. 1980).
202 Olsen, supra note 4, at 1578.
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important, even when the sex generalization is accurate in the aggre-
gate, these generalizations tend to be self-fulfilling and oppressive to the
individual who fails to fit the mold.203 In using explicit sex classifica-
tions the state may perpetuate arbitrary limits on human freedom and
equality. Based on these concerns, scrutiny of sex-based classifications
is intended to ensure that there are important governmental reasons for
treating men and women differently when they are in all relevant re-
spects the same.
Also, the equality issues raised by laws affecting reproductive biol-
ogy are related, in part, to accuracy, as when the state uses the fact that
women may become pregnant to justify barring all women, pregnant or
not, from public life and responsible work. In addition, the laws may
generate a self-fulfilling expectation, as when the fact that women bear
children is used to justify an assumption that women have greater re-
sponsibility to nurture them after birth. Because these concerns are
raised in a context in which men and women seem to have real differ-
ences, the inaccuracy or the stereotype may not be apparent.
Because this context may present differences between the sexes
that are relevant to lawmakers, a proper concern for equality requires
scrutiny that is directly focused on the impact of the rule rather than its
purpose or structure. For example, programs providing material sup-
port to pregnant women are not necessarily premised on inaccurate as-
sumptions about their need. Laws restricting or facilitating access to
abortion do not inaccurately assume that only women need abortions.
Neither type of law crates a culturally imposed constraint on the ability
to sustain or to avoid pregnancy. Still, these laws raise equality con-
cerns because state control of a woman's reproductive capacity and ex-
aggeration of the significance of biological difference has historically
been central to the oppression of women. When the state bars pregnant
women from doing work they are able to do or denies women access to
reproductive health services, the state, as well as nature, denies women
equality.
If we are persuaded that the fourteenth amendment's equality
guarantee constrains legislative authority to regulate reproductive biol-
ogy and that such laws raise issues different from those raised by laws
that classify explicitly on the basis of sex, we must then consider what
standard is appropriate for evaluating such laws. I propose that laws
governing reproductive biology should be scrutinized by courts to en-
sure that (1) the law has no significant impact in perpetuating either
the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex-role constraints on
20 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 132:955
RETHINKING SEX
individual freedom or (2) if the law has this impact, it is justified as the
best means of serving a compelling state purpose. Given how central
state regulation of biology has been to the subjugation of women, the
normal presumption of constitutionality is inappropriate and the state
should bear the burden of justifying its rule in relation to either
proposition.
This proposed test is a substantial improvement over current sex
equality doctrine and the alternate approaches discussed above. Most
fundamentally, the test recognizes that laws classifying according to bi-
ological differences raise equality concerns and must therefore be tested
under equality norms. The test would also be consistent with a consti-
tutional doctrine of sex equality grounded in the ERA-the test recog-
nizes that the legislature may sometimes have legitimate reason to take
account of biological reproductive difference, even if, as under an ERA
standard, explicit sex-based classifications are prohibited.20 4
The test departs from contemporary equal protection analysis in
that it does not require any comparison between allegedly similarly sit-
uated classes of people. This departure is appropriate because laws
governing reproductive biology, by definition, govern ways in which
men and women are not similarly situated. 0 5 The requirement that
similarly situated individuals be treated the same does not exhaust the
idea of equality. 06 Equality is a substantive goal, not simply a neat
204 The equality analysis advocated here is similar to that presented in Brown,
ERA Article, supra note 19, in that it would scrutinize laws that classify based on
biological differences differently than laws that establish explicit sex-based classifica-
tions. Like that article's analysis, the standard proposed here would demand "careful"
scrutiny of laws based on biological differences. Id. at 958.
Despite the formalistic similarity between the approach advocated here and that
adopted in the ERA Article, I believe that the Yale analysis underestimates the problem
that laws based on biological differences pose for sex equality.
See also Brown, ERA Article, supra note 19, at 909 ("Most of the objections
which have been addressed to the absolute form of the Amendment are answered by the
fact that the Amendment is inapplicable to laws dealing with unique physical charac-
teristics of one sex or by application of the constitutional right of privacy."); id. at 961
("Like rape, the definition of sodomy can be limited to penetration by the penis. Where
sodomy is defined in this way, such that females are incapable of committing it, laws
restricted to males may be sustained under the Equal Rights Amendment."); id. at 979
("[The ERA] embodies a consistent theory that guarantees equal legal rights for both
sexes while taking into account unique physical differences between the sexes."); supra
text accompanying note 70.
105 Compare Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976) and Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tertn-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) with Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword:
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) and
Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory
of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973).
110 The animating purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to guarantee "the
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classification or a rational relationship between means and ends. In-
stead of evaluating the extent to which men and women differ in rela-
tion to a particular classification, the proposed test requries that a court
consider the impact of the classification. This approach is similar to
Professor MacKinnon's °7 but it limits the direct inquiry into a law's
effect upon perpetuating inequality to those cases in which that difficult
inquiry is necessary to ensure that the law is consistent with the consti-
tutional requirement of sex equality.2"'
The second part of the test is the compelling interest analysis. This
strict scrutiny of the law is undertaken only after a court has deter-
mined that the law has a significant impact on perpetuating the ine-
quality of women. Sometimes a law governing reproductive biology
could be approved without a demonstration that it was the best means
of serving a compelling state purpose, either because it had no discern-
able effect in oppressing women (for example, recordkeeping require-
ments) or because all of the effects we can discern are beneficial to
women (for example, nutritional programs for pregnant women). But
once we were convinced that a law governing reproductive biology op-
pressed women or perpetuated sex-role constraints, the state should
bear the burden of justifying the law as the best means of serving a
compelling state purpose.209 In race discrimination cases the require-
ment of compelling justification has been "strict" in theory and "fatal"
in fact. 10 This is not surprising given our broad cultural commitment
to the assimilationist vision that explicit race classifications never accu-
rately describe categorical differences. Since laws governing reproduc-
tive biology do accurately describe sex based differences, we should not
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who
had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
207 See supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
208 For a discussion of these types of cases, see infra part VI.
209 In proposing a "compelling" justification standard that is, in a formalistic
sense, tougher than the standard articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(explicit sex classifications must be closely related to important government interests), I
do not necessarily mean to suggest that regulation of reproductive biology is a more
serious obstacle to sex-based equality than explicit sex-based classifications. Although I
believe that application of the compelling interest test in this context is most appropri-
ate in light of equal protection analysis, I am skeptical whether the difference between
a standard that demands that the state produce a "compelling" justification, and one
that demands a showing of "close relation to important government interests" is out-
come determinative. Burden of proof and good faith in the application of the verbal
formula are the critical questions.
20 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tenn-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972).
[Vol. 132:955
RETHINKING SEX
expect that a standard that demands a high level of justification will
always be fatal in fact. Given the core importance of reproduction, laws
recognizing reproductive biology might well be the best means of serv-
ing a compelling state purpose. But, once we have determined that a
law governing reproductive biology oppresses women and perpetuates
sex-role constraints on human liberty, it is essential to require that the
state demonstrate very strong justification to support its action. The de-
mand for compelling justification for such laws is supported by our
history in which biology has been so central to the subjugation of
women.
21 1
The proposed two-level analysis also parallels the Supreme
Court's contemporary reproductive freedom doctrine, which asks
whether laws governing abortion restrict access to service and, if so,
whether the legislation is supported by compelling state interests. 12
This doctrine allows the states to adopt regulations-such as record-
keeping requirements-that do not impinge on access to services, with-
out demanding that the state show compelling justification in support of
such regulations. Similarly, the proposed test would subject regulations
to strict scrutiny only when they restrict access to services because only
those regulations have a significant impact in perpetuating oppression
of women and sex role constraints. The proposed standard departs from
the contemporary constitutional standard governing abortion laws in
one important respect. In the abortion cases only protection of maternal
health is recognized as a compelling state interest prior to fetal viabil-
ity.213 The more general equality standard proposed here allows a com-
pelling state interest to be established in relation to the broader sub-
stantive concerns of sex equality, including the oppression of women
and the constraints of traditional sex roles.
Two criticisms of the approach advocated here deserve brief exam-
ination. First, in relation to laws governing reproductive biology, it suf-
fers from the same inadequacies I have observed in Professor MacKin-
non's suggestion that constitutional equality doctrine should ask simply
whether a challenged policy or practice contributes to the oppression of
women; that is, it is exceedingly difficult to determine what perpetuates
sex-based deprivation, and standards that rely on judicial discretion are
likely to provide weak protection. However, under the approach advo-
cated here, the area of discretion is limited to laws governing reproduc-
tive biology; explicit sex-based classifications would continue to be eval-
211 See supra notes 13-14.
212 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S.
Ct. 2481, 2490-93 (1983).
21' See id. at 2490-93.
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uated under an arguably more reliable comparative standard. A second
possible criticism of my suggested approach is that, while it requries
that equality concerns be brought to bear on laws governing biological
difference, it does not allow a legislature to use explicit sex-based clas-
sifications to recognize or reward traditional women's work or supposed
female virtues that are not based in biological difference. Achieving in-
creased social valuation of women and their traditional work is a criti-
cally important enterprise. But judicial enforcement of constitutional
norms seems better suited to the more modest objective of formal com-
parative equality, with its relatively more reliable standards.
Finally, it is important to understand that my argument that the
constitutional guarantee of equality requries that courts carefully scru-
tinize whether laws governing reproductive biology perpetuate state-
imposed restraints on sex equality is not a claim that the state has an
affirmative obligation to mitigate the effects of biological difference.
Analysis of the question when the state may take affirmative action to
remedy race- or sex-based disadvantage is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. However, a clear distinction between laws using explicit sex-
based classifications and those governing reproductive biology may be
helpful in thinking about this issue. Affirmative action programs using
explicit sex- or race-based classifications are justifiable in relation to
the reality of historic oppression and the need for transitional measures
to make equality of opportunity possible." 4 But compensatory laws
based explicitly on sex or race may perpetuate stereotypes of inferi-
ority.2 5 Laws governing sex-specific physical characteristics, however,
214 See generally Wasserstrom, Topics, supra note 22 ("The State certainly has a
legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the
disabling effect of identified discrimination."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J.). Justice Blackmun, writing in support of the
affirmative action program designed and instituted by the University of California to
increase the numbers of minority medical students, said,
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when an
"affirmative action" program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic
of the past. I would hope that we could reach this stage within a decade at
the most. But the story of Brown v. Board of Education, 437 U.S. 483
(1954), decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope
is a slim one. At some time, however, beyond any period of what some
would claim is only transitional inequality, the United States must and
will reach a stage of maturity where action along this line is no longer
necessary. Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of
the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instruc-
tive but that is behind us.
Id. at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
21 See Taub & Schneider, supra note 118, at 134-35. The danger of reinforcing
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raise different issues. Special benefits for pregnant women, for exam-
ple, ought to be analyzed in relation to the special needs of pregnant
women, rather than as a means of providing compensation for past dis-
crimination against women generally or pregnant women in particular.
Laws governing sex-specific physical characteristics are not transitional
measures enabling us to move toward sex-based equal opportunity in
relation to reproductive capacity.
Now that a new approach to understanding the sex equality im-
plications of laws that classify on the basis of biological differences has
been outlined, the next part will apply the analysis to a variety of state
laws related to abortion and pregnancy.
V. SEX-BASED EQUALITY AND LAWS GOVERNING
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY
Applying the test developed in section IV to laws classifying on the
basis of biological differences entails several inquiries. The threshold
inquiry is whether the law makes a classification that is based on bio-
stereotypes may be greater in relation to sex-based classifications than in relation to
race-based classifications because sex roles define appropriate ways of acting and being
more comprehensively than race roles. Further sex-based classifications are especially
invidious because they have often provided the protection and help of the pedestal that
turns out to be a cage. No one ever defended chattel slavery as an institution adopted
for the benefit of black people.
Nonetheless, the Court has approved compensatory sex-based classifications more
readily than those based on race. Compare Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)
and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (approving compensatory sex-based
classifications) with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Justice Powell, writing for himself in Bakke, asserted,
Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and prac-
tical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or eth-
nic criteria. With respect to gender there are only two possible classifica-
tions. The incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential classifications
is clear. There are no rival groups which can claim that they, too, are
entitled to preferential treatment . . . . The resolution of these same
questions in the context of racial and ethnic preferences presents far more
complex and intractable problems than gender-based classifications.
Id. at 302-03. He also stated that sex discrimination does not share the "lengthy and
tragic history" of race discrimination. See id. at 303.
But in other contexts the Court has recognized the historic oppression of women.
See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) ("Whether from overt discrimina-
tion or from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is
inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs."). Discrimination
against women has always been ostensibly benign, accomplished under the guise of
protecting women either by compensating them for their physical frailties or or by
making allowance for their special contributions to society. This reality may make it
more, rather than less, difficult to evaluate whether sex-based protective laws hurt or
help women seeking equality. See Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women:
Pedestal or Cage?, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173 (1979).
19841 1013
1014 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
logical differences. As we saw in section II,216 this inquiry is not triv-
ial-a law that implicates biological differences may actually be a cate-
gorical sex-based classification.217 If the law is found to be based on
biological differences, the court must then consider whether the law has
a substantial impact on perpetuating the inequality of women. If so, the
court must engage in traditional strict scrutiny analysis to see whether
the law is justified by a compelling state interest.
This part first applies the proposed test to laws restricting access
to abortion. Such laws classify according to a sex-specific physical char-
acteristic and have been central to enforcing the inferior status of
women.218 The second section applies the proposed standard to a vari-
216 See supra notes 45-119 and accompanying text.
217 There is substantial evidence that the judiciary is not able to distinguish be-
tween biology and the social consequences attached to it. See generally supra part IV.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court upheld an Alabama rule
excluding women from the position of prison guard. Justice Stewart said,
The likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a
woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim of the assault but
also to the basic control of the penitentiary and protection of its inmates
and other security personnel. The employee's very womanhood would thus
directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence
of the correctional counselor's responsibility.
Id. at 336. A rule excluding women from positions in which they might be subject to
rape is not a law governing a sex-specific physical characteristic or reproductive biol-
ogy. Rather the Alabama policy, like that approved in Michael M., rests on the stereo-
type of male aggression and female vulnerability. Both men and women guards are
vulnerable to assault, and indeed, to rape.
In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), the Court upheld male-only draft
registration, relying on the syllogism that the purpose of registration is to raise combat
troops and, since women are excluded from combat, it is therefore constitutional to
register only men. The premise that it is permissible to exclude women from combat
was not examined. See supra note 157. The assumption that men are fit for combat
and women are not is both false and not based on sex-specific biology. See supra note
157.
A third example of judicial confusion between biology and the social consequences
attached to it can be seen in the court cases rejecting the claims of same-sex couples
who seek to marry. In Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), the
court characterized marriage as "the appropriate and desirable forum for procrea-
tion . . . .[which] exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal
values associated with the propagation of the human race. . . . [Tihe definition of
marriage ... is founded upon the unique physical characteristics of the sexes." 11
Wash. App. at 259, 522 P.2d at 1195. Inasmuch as marriage is not an institution
limited to people who are able to procreate, I believe this court erred in characterizing
it as a law governing sex-specific physical characteristics or reproductive biology.
21" After the Civil War, many states and territories enacted criminal penalties for
abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139 (1973), and sources cited therein; see
also L. GORDON, WOMEN'S BODY, WOMEN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH
CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 at 200-25 (1978).
In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun identified three justifications for the criminal
abortion laws of the nineteenth century: "Victorian social concern to discourage illicit
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ety of other laws that regulate according to biological differences.
sexual conduct"; protection of the pregnant woman from medical procedures that
"placed her life in serious jeopardy"; and finally, in a distinctly secondary role, protec-
tion of "prenatal life." 410 U.S. at 148-50. Gordon's and Mohr's work confirm and
refine this historical analysis.
Victorian social mores did not, as Justice Blackmun suggested, simply condemn
"illicit sexual conduct." Gordon demonstrates that, with the beginning of industrial
capitalism in the first part of the nineteenth century, production drew men out of the
home to socialized work places and undermined the economic basis of agrarian family
unity. In reaction to this weakening of the economic basis of the traditional stability of
the family structure, Victorian ideology arose to maintain family stability.
Victorian prudery was closely connected to the doctrine of a separate
sphere of concerns for women. This notion that women were profoundly
different from men. . . was simultaneously a description of a new reality:
a male-imposed doctrine to keep women from escaping their homes and
women's adaptation to their new situation.
L. GORDON, supra, at 18.
Some women had challenged these constraints. In 1848, the first recorded women's
rights convention was held in Seneca Falls, New York. The Declaration of Sentiments,
adopted at this convention, discussed discrimination against women in marriage, em-
ployment, education, criminal law, and the church. See I E. STANTON, S. ANTHONY &
M. GAGE, HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 70-71 (1881). The next 20 years were,
until the present, the most active period in the struggle for women's rights. Gordon's
central thesis is that reaction to women's assertion of independence was a major factor
motivating and justifying the enactment of criminal restrictions on abortion. See L.
GORDON, supra, at 414-18. Mohr agrees that this factor was important. See J. MOHR,
supra, at 168.
In the late nineteenth century the types of women seeking abortion changed. Id. at
46-50, 86-102; L. GORDON, supra, at 51-60. No longer were abortions sought solely
because of illegitimacy or adultery; rather "respectable" women began to seek abortiofis
to limit family size. J. MOHR, supra, at 86-102. Nineteenth century lobbyists for crim-
inal restrictions on abortion expressed concern with the fact the birthrates were declin-
ing among the white, Yankee Protestants relative to Catholics and non-whites. Id. at
166-67. Gordon states,
Fears about immigrants and the poor reproducing faster than the Yankee
elite had been current since before the Civil War. Physicians in particular
noticed demographic patterns. Nathan Allen, a New England doctor, re-
ported that in 1860 the foreign-born population of Massachusetts pro-
duced more children than the Yankees and that in 1877 a full 77 per cent
of the births in all New England were Catholic. Another physician wrote
that the birth rate was declining in "our most intelligent communities."
Medical journals carried many similar articles of warning.
L. GORDON, supra, at 138 (footnotes omitted).
Finally, the medical profession was the major group lobbying for the restrictive
abortion laws. It was, however, not simply that abortions were dangerous to the
woman, but rather that abortions were generally performed by "irregulars": midwives,
professional abortionists, empirical medics, herbalists, and other practitioners. The
1830's saw a blossoming of a popular health movement, dominated by women practi-
tioners, particularly directed to women's health problems, and emphasizing education,
nutrition, and self-reliance. Id. at 162-65; see also B. EHRENREICH & D. ENGLISH,
WITCHES, MIDWIVES, AND NURSES: A HISTORY OF WOMEN HEALERS 24-27 (1973).
Mohr's central thesis is that the regular allopathic medical profession sought these re-
strictive laws to promote the authority of regular doctors and to restrict their irregular
competitors. See J. MOHR, supra at 147-70. Gordon agrees. See L. GORDON, supra, at
59-60. Mohr also argues that many physicians sincerely believed that abortion was
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A. Abortion Restrictions and the Proposed Sex-Based
Equality Analysis
Abortion laws present no analytic difficulty for determining
whether the classification is based on biological differences. The pro-
posed analysis clearly applies to state regulation of abortion. Only
women become pregnant; only women have abortions. Technology
sometimes allows human beings to transcend the limits of biology. We
fly. We visit Antarctica and space. Advances in human understanding,
science, and medicine allow us to control reproductive capacity and to
terminate a pregnancy at minimal risk to the health or future reproduc-
tive capacity of the woman. Nature demands that women alone bear
the physical burdens of pregnancy, but society, through the law, can
either mitigate or exaggerate the cost of these burdens. When the state
denies women access to abortion, both nature and the state imposeupon
women burdens of unwanted pregnancy that men do not bear. 19
The constitutional equality principle advocated here asks us to
consider whether the state can meet the burden of proving that a law
wrong because of moral concerns about the fetus. See J. MOHR, supra, at 165.
Prior to the development of antiseptic technique, abortion was extremely danger-
ous to the health of the woman, perhaps more dangerous than normal childbirth. But
abortion was not then prohibited. At the historical moment when the development of
antiseptic technique made it possible to do more good than harm through surgical pro-
cedures, abortion was prohibited. Compare P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 156-57 (1982) (improvements in surgery) with J. MOHR,
supra, at 200-25 (criminalization of abortion). This history strongly suggests that ma-
ternal health is not the primary issue at stake in the regulation of abortion.
29 Nineteenth century concepts of causation often sought a single cause for any
phenomenon or a single human wrongdoer for any injury. See, e.g., Bohlen, Contribu-
tory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 238 (1908); F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 139 (1874). This approach to causation was functional in
limiting liability and reinforcing individualist ideology. See Horowitz, The Doctrine of
Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 201, 202 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). The
twentieth century law normally recognizes that any phenomenon is the result of many
concurring "causes" and that causation is probabilistic. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971).
More complex, sophisticated concepts of causation, which have come to dominate
other arias of political and legal thought, often are not extended to sex-based biological
difference. The assumption that biology'causes women to bear the burdens of unwanted
pregnancy is extremely functional, if somewhat simple-minded. In a related example of
a simple-minded concept of causation, Justice Stewart asserted in Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980), that "[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent
woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice
are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her
indigency."
President Jimmy Carter, defending the exclusion of abortion from the otherwise
comprehensive Medicaid program, stated, "Life is unfair." N.Y. Times, July 13, 1977,
§ 1, at 10, col. 5. Life may be unfair, but when the state excises the finding of abortions
from Medicaid the state exacerbates the unfairness.
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governing reproductive biology either (1) has no significant impact in
perpetuating the oppression of women or culturally imposed sex role
constraints on individual freedom or (2) is the best means for meeting a
compelling state purpose.
The burdens of unwanted pregnancy, which laws restricting abor-
tion impose upon women, are enormous. First, such laws enforce the
invasion of women's bodies. The physical burdens of pregnancy always
include minor discomfort and physical intrusion and always pose risks
of permanent damage to health and life itself that are vastly greater
than the risks of abortion.220
Second, restricting access to abortion dramatically impairs the
woman's capacity for individual self-determination. When the state
prohibits abortion, all women of childbearing age know that pregnancy
may violently alter their lives at any time.2 This pervasively affects
the ability of women to plan their lives, to sustain relationships with
other people, and to contribute through wage work and public life. The
right to equal citizenship encompasses the right "to take responsibility
for choosing one's own future. . .. [T]o be a person is to respect one's
own ability to make responsible choices in controlling one's own
destiny, to be an active participant in society rather than an object." '222
Denying abortion denies women the capacity of responsible citizenship.
Third, the decision of whether or not to bear a child is inescapably
a complex moral and practical one, requiring consideration of relations
with existing people and one's capacity to care for the child or to find
others who will do so. Bearing a child creates a profoundly intimate
relationship between the woman and the child, even when that rela-
220 The risks of death or serious complications are at least seven times greater in
childbirth than in first trimester abortion. Cates, Smith, Rochat & Grimes, Mortality
From Abortion and Childbirth: Are the Statistics Biased?, 248 J. A.M.A. 192 (1982);
LeBolt, Grimes & Gates, Mortality From Abortion and Childbirth: Are the Popula-
tions Comparable?, 248 J. A.M.A. 188 (1982). The health risks of pregnancy and
childbirth are greatly exacerbated when a pregnancy is unwanted. Cates, Legal Abor-
tion: The Public Health Record, 215 Sci. 1586, 1587 (1982).
I2 Every fertile woman is vulnerable to the risk of an unwanted pregnancy re-
sulting from rape. See supra note 178. The risks of unwanted pregnancy fall most
heavily on sexually active heterosexual women. All methods of contraception are imper-
fect; the methods that are most effective in preventing pregnancy pose the greatest dan-
ger to the woman's health. Women using various methods of contraception run the
following risks of unintended pregnancy each year: oral contraceptives, 2.4%; IUD,
4.6%; condom, 9.6%; diaphragm, 18.6%; foam, 17.9%; rhythm, 23.7%. Schrim, Trus-
sell, Menken & Grady, Contraceptive Failure In the United States: The Impact of
Social, Economic and Demographic Factors, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 68 (1982).
22 Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 58 (1977). Karst notes that "[t]he
abortion question was not merely a 'women versus fetuses' issue; it was also a feminist
issue, an issue going to women's position in society." Id.
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tionship ends shortly after birth.2  For many women who attempt to
live in accordance with mainstream Protestant and Jewish faith, reli-
gious belief informs the decision whether to bear a child.224 For other
2' Although two-thirds of births to unmarried teenagers are unintended, few
teenage mothers place babies for adoption or for care by friends or relatives. Ninety-six
percent of unmarried teenage mothers-90% of white and virtually all of black
mothers-keep their children. ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREG-
NANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY (1981).
224 Mainstream Protestants believe that the Bible, as interpreted through the per-
son of Jesus Christ, imposes a duty on individuals to make deliberate decisions about
childbearing, according to principles of responsible parenthood. Rev. John Philip
Wagaman, Dean and Professor of Christian Social Ethics at Wesley Theological Semi-
nary and past president of the American Society of Christian Ethics, explains that
"nearly no aspect of life is more sacred, closer to being human in relation to God, than
bringing a new life into the world to share in the gift of God's grace and God's cove-
nant." McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 700 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub. nom. Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The question is whether one "is bringing a life into
the world under conditions which make it possible for that life to participate in God's
intention . . . (and under conditions which will not) threaten to undermine the theo-
logically understood fulfillment of already existing human beings." Id. at 700-01. Al-
though in Protestant teaching the basic judgment whether to bear a child is "referred to
the woman and her own religious conscience," there are circumstances in which abor-
tion may be "mandatory as a person's responsibility before God." Id. at 702.
Protestant theology does not regard the fetus as a person "until that stage in devel-
opment where someone has begun experience of reality." This view flows from "the
covenant [that] subsists between God as the Creator of reality and those who have
begun to experience the reality which God has created." Id. at 701.
Professor Beverly Harrison explains this pro-choice theology:
We encounter God through relationship with all that nurtures and sus-
tains life. . . . Freedom, when understood as the power of creativity,
achieves its consummate expression in deepened community. . . . To be
free means possessing the power to imaginatively interact with others, to
give and to receive, to act upon and to suffer (that is, to be acted upon), to
participate with others in co-creating a world. . . . God is not the one
who stands remotely in control, but the One who binds us and bids us to
deep relationality, resulting in a radical equality motivated by genuine
mutuality and interdependence.
B. HARRISON, OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE, TOWARD A NEW ETHIC OF ABORTION 99,
100, 108 (1983). In this view "the moral life involves a process of selecting and inte-
grating many potential values through strategic choices." Id. at 110. The decision to
have an abortion or a child requires consideration of relations with existing people, as
well as assessment of capacity to provide care for the child.
The second theme of pro-choice theology focuses on the health of the mother. Jew-
ish thought places a high value on the individual obligation to protect her own health.
The Biblical injunction, "Therefore, choose life," refers not to the everlasting life
promised to Christians through baptism and faith, but to life in this world. As Rabbi
David Feldman explains, "[W]hen a woman's life or health is threatened. . . abortion
. . . becomes mandatory." Abortion is "appropriate" since "the duty is to choose life."
McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 696 (testimony of Rabbi David Feldman). Rabbi Feldman's
views are also set forth in MARITAL RELATIONS, CONTRACEPTION, AND ABORTION
(1976).
In Jewish thought the fetus is not a person until it "emerges from the womb into
the world, or, more exactly until the head of the infant emerges, or, in the case of a
breach birth, half of the body emerges." McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 697. The abortion
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women who are not formally religious, the choice is a conscientious
one. 225 By restricting access to abortion, the state necessarily denies the
capacity of women as independent moral decisionmakers.226
Finally, state action restricting access to abortion imposes a crush-
ing restraint on the heterosexual women's capacity for sexual expres-
sion.227 At the heart of Sigmund Freud's central innovation in modern
thought is his recognition of the pervasive imaginative force of sexuality
in the life of human beings.2 28 For humans, sexual relations are invalu-
able expressions of love and bonding that strengthen the intimate rela-
tionships that give life meaning.229 More than one hundred years after
Freud "it is depressing to have to insist that sex is not an unnecessary,
morally dubious self-indulgence, but a basic human need, no less for
decision is nonetheless a serious moral matter because it involves potential human life.
There are sharp divisions in Jewish thought, with Orthodox Jews and some Conserva-
tives holding that only the most serious threats to a woman's life justify abortion, while
those in the Reform tradition embrace a broader definition of health, holding that the
primary concern is the welfare of the mother and the final decision is the woman's. Id.
22' Conceding that restrictions on abortion impose enormous burdens upon
women, it might be argued that the burdens are comparable to those imposed upon
people subject to the draft and that the state is free to impose burdens on citizens in
furtherance of legislative judgments about morality and public policy. Because Congress
provides conscientious objectors statutory exemption from military service, the Court
has not confronted the question whether such exemption is constitutionally required.
However, the Court has construed the apparently theistic statutory language to extend
exemption to those who hold a sincere belief occupying "a place in the life of its posses-
sor parallel to the filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965). See Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (upholding a similar objection by a Jehovah's witness to
working on the production of weaponry).
226 See generally C. GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 64-105.
2217 See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affirming
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Thomas Gray observes that the contraception and abortion cases employ rhetoric
"dedicated to the cause of social stability through the reinforcement of traditional insti-
tutions and have nothing to do with the sexual liberation of the individual. They re-
present two standard conservative views: social stability is threatened by excessive pop-
ulation growth, and family stability is threatened by unwanted pregnancies." Gray,
Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1980).
See also Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy:
Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1979).
The equality analysis presented here does not directly address the problem of con-
stitutional protection for sexual expression. However, insofar as the law has tradition-
ally enforced a sexual double standard respecting the sexual autonomy of heterosexual
men while denying the legitimacy of female and male homosexuality, equality analysis
may be an important component of a more general right to sexual expression. There is
a deep, complex interrelationship between sexist and homophobic attitudes in a patriar-
chal society. Full exploration of these relationships is beyond the scope of this Article.
228 Freud, "Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, in 9 THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 181 (standard ed. 1908).
229 1. EIBL-EIBESFELDT, LOVE AND HATE 155-64 (1972).
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women than for men." 2 80
State restrictions on access to abortion plainly oppress women. Roe
v. Wade231 condemns such laws as a violation of the constitutional right
to privacy. The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to equality, blunts our
ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed when
abortion is denied. A privacy right that demands that "the abortion
decision. . . be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician," 2 2 gives doctors undue power by falsely casting
the abortion decision as primarily a medical question.2"3 The rhetoric
of privacy also reinforces a public/private dicotomy that is at the heart
of the structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of women.
23 4
Although laws restricting access to abortion plainly oppress
women, the standard proposed here would allow the oppressive restric-
tion of access to abortions if the law withstood strict scrutiny. Consider-
ing the regulation of access to abortion under privacy doctrine, rather
than sex equality doctrine, does not make it easier to address the diffi-
cult question of whether the state has a compelling justification for re-
230 Willis, Abortion: Is a Woman a Person?, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note
34, at 471, 474.
231 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
232 Id. at 164.
233 The woman's attitude toward her pregnancy is the most important factor in
determining whether or not an abortion is medically indicated. There are virtually no
situations in which a physician would recommend an abortion to a woman who sought
to continue the pregnancy and who was able to cooperate in doing so. On the other
hand, the very fact that the pregnancy is unwanted produces intense stress, which exac-
erbates a variety of conditions, making them life and health threatening. See McRae v.
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 664-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub. nom. Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
In every state it is a crime for anyone other than a doctor to perform an abortion,
and the constitutionality of such requirements has been affirmed. See Connecticut v.
Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975). Yet abortion is not a technically complex procedure. Mid-
wives, nurse practitioners, and other nonphysician health care providers deliver babies
and provide a variety of other services that are as medically complex as first trimester
abortions. See Donovan, Medical Societies vs. Nurse Practitioners, 15 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 166 (1983); see also Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion
and Sterilization Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 51 (1983).
234 Kathleen Powers observes,
By maintaining a world split into public and private spheres, by denying
women the right to participate in the public sphere and then refusing to
regulate the private sphere or deferring to custom when compelled to reg-
ulate that sphere, the legal order effectively excluded women from its op-
erations and constrained women to exist in a pre-modern world of custom-
ary law, a world where personal conduct was determined by patterns of
custom and reciprocal expectations and where the distinction between
habit and duty became blurred and ill defined.
Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 Wis. L. REV. 55, 78. See also Olsen, supra note 4.
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stricting women's access to abortion. The only reason seriously ad-
vanced for restricting abortion today, and the only one that could
possibly justify the oppression of women under a strict scrutiny analy-
sis, is protection of fetal life.235 The abortion debate is often cast as a
conflict between the rights of a woman and those of a fetus.2 36 Oppo-
nents of abortion characterize it as murder. Neither equality nor pri-
vacy can support an asserted right to murder.
But, even if we regard the fetus as a person, it does not necessarily
follow that abortion is murder. It is "impossible to judge whether an
act is murder simply by looking at the act, without considering its con-
text."'237 Ellen Willis argues that we can assume that the fetus is a
person and yet support a woman's right to choose abortion as a form of
self defense.
[N]o thoughtful pacifist would equate Hitler's murder of the
Jews with the Warsaw Ghetto rebels' killing of Nazi
troops. . . . However gratifying pregnancy may be to a
woman who desires it, for the unwilling it is literally an in-
vasion-the closest analogy is the difference between love-
making and rape. . . . [A]bortion is by normal standards an
act of self-defense.238
Similarly, Donald Regan argues that even if we think of the fetus
as a person, evenhanded application of the general common law princi-
ple that people are not required to aid others, particularly when aid
can only be provided at significant cost and risk to the rescuer, demands
respect for the woman's right to refuse to aid the fetus.239
235 See L. SUMMNER, ABORTION AND MORAL THEORY 23-24 (1981).
238 For example, John Ely observes, "Compared with men, very few women sit in
our legislatures, a fact I believe should bear some relevance-even without an Equal
Rights Amendment-to the appropriate standard of review for legislation that favors
men over women. But no fetuses sit in our legislatures." Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wol." A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 (1973).
Professor Ely misapprehends the nature of the fetus. The traditional formulation
of a rights conflict between the woman and the fetus
is based on a mistaken parallel between adult life and fetal life. Once we
understand how the special circumstances of pregnancy affect a fetus's
right to life, we see the problem of abortion in a new light-as a moral
issue of care, nurture, and responsibility, rather than a conflict of rights-
between woman and fetus.
Farrell-Smith, Rights-Conflict, Pregnancy, and Abortion, in BEYOND
DOMINATION 265 (C. Gould ed. 1983).
237 Willis, supra note 230, at 473.
238 Id.
I"9 Regan, in Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979), argues
that restricting access to abortion denies equal protection of the law, not because it
discriminates on the basis of sex, but rather because it excludes pregnant women from
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The strengths of these formulations are that they come squarely to
grips with the assertion that the state has an interest in protecting the
fetus,24 and they recognize the magnitude of the injury inflicted upon
women who are forced to continue an unwanted pregnancy. But these
justifications for abortion are disquieting. Regan defends abortion on
the same grounds we might support the legal right to refuse to throw a
rope to a drowning child-as an action that is morally wrong but le-
gally protected. Willis's self-defense formulation is equally troubling.
The legalistic analogy to self-defense justifies abortion only in the lim-
ited circumstances in which the mother reasonably believes that she
will suffer death or great bodily harm.241 Further, even if it is legally
justifiable to kill an innocent person who threatens our life or well-
being, the morality of such killing seems dubious. Thus both Regan
and Willis characterize abortion as a conflict between the rights of the
woman and the rights of the fetus. Both treat the fetus as a person and
the protection of the "deeply rooted principle of American law that an individual is
ordinarily not required to volunteer aid to another individual who is in danger or in
need of assistance." Id. at 1569. Individual interests in physical integrity and non-
subordination, recognized by the common law no-duty-to-aid principle, are also consti-
tutionally protected by the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude
and the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. On the constitu-
tional protection of physical integrity, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03
(1976) (denial of medical treatment for prisoners is a violation of the eighth amend-
ment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (pumping the stomach of a suspect is
a violation of due process). On the constitutional value of non-subordination, see Taylor
v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) (peonage is violation of thirteenth amendment); Bailey
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (involuntary servitude encompasses more than
slavery).
Regan argues that, even if we hypothesize that the fetus is a full human being, the
equality guarantee nonetheless prohibits the state from singling out pregnant women
and demanding that these individuals sacrifice their physical integrity to aid a person in
need.
[C]onsider a simple burning building, with a child trapped inside.
Would a court impose criminal liability on anyone, even the child's par-
ent, who did not attempt to save the child at the risk of second-degree
burns over one or two percent of his or her body? . . .
[A]n innocent life can be saved by a physical invasion comparable to
or less than pregnancy and delivery. . . . [E]ven if the potential rescuer is
specified to be the child's parent, liability is unlikely. In all other cases,
the suggested imposition is unthinkable in the context of our legal system.
Regan, supra, at 1588. Those who have advocated a legal duty to rescue would limit
the duty to situations in which rescue can be effected without significant cost or physi-
cal risk to the rescuer. See, e.g., Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REv. 97, 111-13
(1908); Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972);
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980); see also Rudolph,
The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1965).
240 But see, e.g., Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade
and its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765, 773 (1973) (decisions in the area of privacy are
not easily controlled by the state).
2411 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 219, at 108-12 (on self-defense).
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defend abortion by analogy to circumstances in which injury to or neg-
lect of a person would be legally, if not morally, justifiable.
The view that abortion is morally suspect is inconsistent with sig-
nificant currents of moral thought.2 42 A stronger defense of abortion
rights must not simply assume that the fetus is a person but must
rather directly challenge the claim that the legislature may declare fetal
life to be personhood or, in the face of uncertainty, may require that
the fetus be treated as a person.
Fetal life is starkly different from all other forms of human life in
that the fetus is completely dependent upon the body of the woman
who conceived it. It cannot survive without her. Although all human
infants, and many adults, are dependent upon others for survival, that
support can be provided by many people. The fetus by contrast is de-
pendent upon a particular woman. "For a fetus, the conditions of life
are such that one other human being, the pregnant woman, is in a
unique position of being able to respond to its alleged right to life."'243
No other human being is in such a relationship with other humans.
This distinguishing characteristic of fetal life supports the line that
Roe v. Wade draws between the woman's right to decide whether to
abort and the state's power to protect fetal life. 4 It is only after birth
that anyone other than the mother can assume responsibility for the
nurture that is indispensible to life. At the point of viability,2 45 when
242 See supra note 224.
243 Farrell-Smith, supra note 236, at 267. See also Fletcher, Abortion, Euthana-
sia, and the Care of Defective Newborns, 292 NEW ENG. J. OF MEDICINE 75 (1975)
(arguing that the fetal dependence upon a particular woman makes abortion morally
distinct from euthanasia of defective infants).
244 410 U.S. at 163.
245 Justice O'Connor, dissenting in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) asserted that, "[t]he Roe framework, then, is
clearly on a collision course with itself . . . .As medical science becomes better able to
provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further
back toward conception." Id. at 2507. She noted that "recent studies have demonstrated
increasingly earlier fetal viability.5 It is certainly reasonable to believe that fetal viabil-
ity in the first trimester of pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant future." Id.
The evidence offered in Justice O'Connor's footnote 5 does not support her claims.
She cites Phillips, Little, Polivy & Lucey, Neonatal Mortality Risk for the Eighties:
The Importance of Birth Weight/ Gestational Age Groups, 68 PEDIATRICS 122 (1981),
for the proposition that infants "with a gestational age of less than 25 weeks and
weight between 500 and 1,249 grams have a 20% chance of survival." 103 S. Ct. 2507
n.5. In fact, the data presented shows that of 523 premature infants treated in a re-
gional intensive care unit between 1976 and 1979, five were 25 weeks or less gesta-
tional age. Two of these babies weighed between 500 and 749 grams and both died; one
baby weighed between 750 and 999 grams and it died; two babies weighed between
1,000 and 1,249 grams and one survived. See id. at 125 table 4. O'Connor observes
ominously, "The aborted fetus in. . .Simopoulos v. Virginia. . . .weighed 495 grams
and was approximately 22 gestational weeks." 103 S. Ct. 2507, n.5.
In support of the claim that fetal viability may soon be possible in the first trimes-
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the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb,"2 46 the state may restrict abortions, except where the life or
health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term.
2 47
ter, Justice O'Connor also cites Kopelman, The Smallest Preterin Infants: Reasons for
Optimism and New Dilemmas, 132 AM. J. DxSEASES CHILDREN 461 (1978). Dr.
Kopelman, Head of Neonatology at East Carolina School of Medicine, comments,
I would respond emphatically that my article does not in any way, shape
or form support such a contention. Furthermore I know of no current
research which would lead me to believe that a fetus of less than 22 weeks
gestation can be or soon will be able to be sustained outside the
uterus ...
Below 24 weeks gestation the fetus' lungs are simply not adequately
developed to sustain oxygenation even with ventilator support.
Letter to Nan Hunter, Sept. 12, 1983 (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review)
Finally Justice O'Connor cites Stern, Intensive Care for the Pre-Term Infant, 26
DANISH MED. BuLL. 144 (1979). Dr. Stem, Professor & Chairman of Pediatrics at
Brown University, responds,
It may well be that some of the other references quoted in the footnote
have demonstrated "increasingly earlier fetal viability," but that is cer-
tainly not what I said in my article . . . . [i]t is highly likely that the
lower limit beyond which human gestation is simply incapable of survival
has already been virtually reached in its entirety, at least insofar as we
intend such survival to be possible without the intervention of some form
of artificial extrauterine environment that could be provided by the suc-
cessful creation of an artificial placenta.
Letter to Nan Hunter, Aug. 3, 1983 (copy on file with University of Pennsylvania Law
Review). After discussing the "extreme technical difficulties" in creating substitutes for
a woman's womb, Dr. Stem observes,
Even if such a procedure could be successfully achieved, not only are its
economic costs staggering to imagine but the potential for ever being able
to supply the technology in sufficiently large numbers of units to make
any kind of impact on the total number of threatened or spontaneously
terminated first trimester gestations would be in practical terms most
unlikely.
Id. In short, the evidence does not support Justice O'Connor's claims in relation to fetal
viability.
Viability is a probabalistic concept that refers to the probability that a fetus has
approximately a a 10% chance of survival outside the womb. See Colantti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 396, n.15 (1979). The probability of survival is affected by gestational
age, fetal weight, general maternal nutrition, and the technological resources available.
It is difficult to make a precise determination of gestational age even after the birth of a
premature infant. Dubowitz, Dubowitz & Goldberg, Clinical Assessment of Gesta-
tional Age in the Newborn Infant, 77 J. PEDIATR. 1 (1970). It is even more difficult to
estimate gestational age or weight in utero. Because of the inherent difficulty and un-
certainty of estimating viability, the Supreme Court has held that states must "afford
the physician adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment." Colantti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. at 387.
246 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
As Roe v. Wade recognizes, the fact that a fetus has some probability of sur-
vival outside of the womb does not necessarily justify state action forcing the woman to
continue to support it. See Frost, Chudwin & Wikler, The Limited Moral Significance
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Thus, the compelling state interest analysis leads one to conclude
that once the fetus has reached the-point of viability the state may re-
strict the availability of abortions, except in cases where the life or
health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried on
to term. Notwithstanding this understanding of the nature of fetal life
and the related strict scrutiny of the government's interest, three power-
ful ideas continue to fuel the effort to criminalize abortions. I believe
that none of these ideas could provide the state with an interest compel-
ling enough to justify any additional limits on access to abortions.
First, many people sincerely believe that a human being exists
from the moment of conception.2 " But as Professor Laurence Tribe
observes,
of Fetal Viability, HASTINGS CNTR REP., Dec. 1980, at 10, 13.
As a practical matter, few abortions are performed near the point of potential fetal
viability. In 1976, 95% of abortions were performed prior to 15 weeks gestation. See
McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 635 (E.D.N.Y.) (presenting data from the U.S.
Center for Disease Control), rev'd sub. nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Less than 1% of abortions are performed for women who are more than 21 weeks
pregnant. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at B-1, B-4, col. 1.
Late term abortions are most commonly performed for girls between ages of 15
and 19, who are slow to realize or acknowledge that they are pregnant and who often
have difficulty in obtaining medical services. Ten per cent of abortions performed after
the end of the first trimester are done for women who have amniocentesis and discover
that the fetus is genetically abnormal. Id. Testing to discover genetic defects in utero
cannot be completed until after 18 to 20 weeks gestation. Colantti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 389, n.8 (1979). A third group of late abortions involve women who contract a
disease during pregnancy that poses a risk to their life or health or that damages the
fetus. McRae, 491 F. Supp. at 678-80.
248 For the Roman Catholic Church, the largest denomination condemning abor-
tion, opposition is grounded on the belief that a human being exists at the moment of
fertilization. Any uncertainty as to the precise moment of "ensoulment" must be re-
solved in favor of the fetus, in part because the concept of original sin means that
unborn life is perfect, born life imperfect. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 692-
93 (E.D.N.Y.) (testimony of Reverend William B. Smith), rev'd sub. nom. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The Declaration on Abortion of the Sacred Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith is "the Church's most definitive and authoritative state-
ment on the morality of direct abortion." See id. at 693. Catholic teaching distinguishes
"indirect" abortion, that is, "operations, treatments and medications which do not di-
rectly intend termination of pregnancy, but which have as their purpose the cure of a
proportionately serious pathological condition of the mother . . . when they cannot be
safely postponed until the fetus is viable." Id. at 694 (quoting from the 1971 Ethical
and religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities).
Catholic doctrine also regards contraception as a form of homicide. Contraception
was treated differently from abortion for the first time in the Second Vatican Council's
Declaration on The Church in the Modern World. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value
in History, in THE MORALTrY OF ABORTION 45-46 (J.T. Noonan ed. 1970). The
distinction was shortlived for, in 1967, the Minority Report of the Papal Panel on
Birth Control, which Pope Paul VI accepted as the basis for his 1968 encyclical
Humanae Vitae, described contraception as "analogous to homocide." See N. ST.
JOHN-STEVAS, THE AGONISING CHoICE 254 (1971), for the view of one Catholic in-
tellectual protesting the equation of abortion and contraception.
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[T]he question when human life truly begins asks not for a
discovery of the point at which the fetus possesses an agreed-
upon set of characteristics which make it human, but rather
for a decision as to what characteristics should be regarded
as defining a human being. And . . that decision in turn
entails not an inference or demonstration from generally
shared premises, whether factual or moral, but a statement
of religious faith upon which people will invariably differ
widely.
249
In a pluralistic society,250 religious belief cannot, by itself, justify a law
imposing oppressive sex discriminatory burdens and demanding that
249 Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973) (citations omit-
ted). Tribe subsequently repudiated this position:
[O]n reflection, that view appears to give too little weight to the value of
allowing religious groups freely to express their convictions in the political
process, underestimates the power of moral convictions unattached to reli-
gious beliefs on this issue, and makes the unrealistic assumption that a
constitutional ruling could somehow dissentangle religion from future
public debate on the question.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 928 (1978).
Tribe's grounds for rejecting his earlier views are not persuasive. No one chal-
lenges the right of religious groups to "express their convictions in the political pro-
cess." The first amendment protects advocacy of racism and the natural subordination
of women and fetal rights, and it protects advocacy doubly when the views promoted
are religiously based. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (state constitution
that disqualifies ministers from serving as legislators violates "free exercise of religion"
clause). There are undoubtedly people opposed to abortion on grounds of "moral con-
viction unattached to religious beliefs." For cases stating that the government cannot
favor any religion or religion over nonreligion, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962). But where moral values are in such sharp conflict, the first amend-
ment requires respect for diversity.
250 The anti-choice theologies are explicitly anti-pluralist. The self-proclaimed
"moral majority" asserts that "[a]fter the Christian majority takes control, pluralism
will be seen as immoral and evil and the state will not permit anybody the right to
practice evil." Gary Potter, President, Catholics for Political Action, quoted in Greene,
The Astonishing Wrongs of the New Moral Right, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1981, at 118.
Some Catholics ethicists, while adhering to belief that the personhood of the fetus
makes abortion a grave sin, oppose use of state power to restrict access to abortion
because of respect for individual human freedom in a pluralistic society. Paper by
Charles Curran, Professor of Moral Theology, Catholic University of America,
presented at NYU Symposium on Abortion and the First Amendment (April, 1980)
(copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Although this view has
not yet prevailed with the Church, "it may be a harbinger of cracks in the seemingly
monolithic Catholic position on abortion funding that a few prominent Catholic intel-
lectuals do dissent." F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLrICS 178-79
(1981). Legislative struggles over anti-contraception laws ended when, in the mid-
1960's, many prominent Catholics of high moral and intellectual stature openly op-
posed efforts of the institutional Church to use public law to enforce natural law doc-
trine condemning birth control. Id. at 175-77.
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others sacrifice their own deeply held conscientious beliefs.251
Second, the right to life movement, as its name implies, aspires to
promote an expanded respect and protection for all forms of human
life. People who are dependent-infants, the poor, the elderly, and the
disabled-make a strong moral claim on the resources of a society of
abundance. Social values of helping and nurture are profoundly impor-
tant.252 But the sustenance the fetus needs is not society's to give. It can
only be provided by a particular pregnant woman. Forcing her to sup-
port the dependent fetus denies her capacity to decide whether that is a
relationship that she can sustain and imposes enormouis costs on her
life, health, and autonomy. Respect for the fetus is purchased at the
cost of denying the value of women.253
2. Governmental support of a particular religious belief is not only an undesir-
able result but is prohibited by the Constitution, see supra note 249. "[A] broader
establishment clause issue, going to a whole area of governmental regulation, is raised
whenever the views of organized religious groups have come to play a pervasive role in
an entire subject's legislative consideration for reasons intrinsic to the subject matter as
then understood." Tribe, supra note 249, at 23 (footnote omitted).
252 As we have seen, the assumption that mothers will choose to assume responsi-
bility for the care necessary to the survival of infants is so ingrained that even thought-
ful people cannot perceive that women nurture by choice, rather than as a result of
biological imperative. See supra notes 146-61 and accompanying text. It is obviously
critically important to children, and to society, that someone assume responsibility for
the care of infants.
Often, those who support a woman's authority to decide whether a bear a child
rely upon the undeniable fact that in this society women choose or are compelled to
care for their children after birth. For example, Ellen Willis argues,
We live in a society that defines childbearing as the mother's job; a society
in which most women are denied access to work that pays enough to sup-
port a family, childcare facilities they can afford, or any relief from the
constant, daily burdens of motherhood; a society that forces mothers into
dependence on marriage or welfare and often into permanent poverty; a
society that is actively hostile to women's ambitions for a better life.
Willis, supra note 230, at 473. The Supreme Court observes,
[A]dditional offspring may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. . . . Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
In defending a woman's right to decide whether to bear a child, I have not relied
upon the social reality that women care for children. That is simply a social arrange-
ment that we could choose to alter. Petchesky, Reproductive Freedom: Beyond "A
Woman's Right to Choose," 5 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 661 (1980),
thoughtfully explores the questions whether there is a conflict between the individualis-
tic "right to choose" and a more connected, caring social vision. She concludes, as do I,
that "control over one's body is a fundamental. . . requirement of being a person and
engaging in conscious activity. Understood thus, it is a principle of a radical morality
that should never be abandoned, under any social conditions." Id. at 666.
22 Professor Tribe argues against policies giving men a right to veto abortion
choice and discusses, in moving terms, the sex differential aspect of denying access to
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Finally, the drive to criminalize abortion is animated by an affir-
mation of the value of a patriarchal society. Many people believe, as a
matter of revealed faith or experience, that women are and should be
subordinate to men, that sex should be limited to procreation, and that
the risk of unwanted pregnancy should function to discourage sex and
to bind families together. 54 But application of the constitutional ideal
of equality to men and women prohibits the state from using its coer-
cive power to enforce patriarchal relations.
Control of reproduction is the sine qua non of women's capacity to
live as equal people. The high place of equality in our constellation of
democratic and constitutional values demands that something more
compelling than traditionalist moral conviction justify state actions de-
nying women that which is indispensibly necessary to their ability to
act as moral beings and to participate in civil society. If and when it
becomes technologically possible to grow children outside of a woman's
body,2"5 the moral and constitutional issues we confront in relation to
abortion will be categorically different than they are today. But for to-
day, reproductive freedom is, inescapably, the core issue of women's
equality and liberty.
B. Application of the Proposed Standard to Other Laws Dealing
with Sex-Specific Physical Characteristics
The standard proposed here asks that we first distinguish between
the means to control reproductive capacity.
To give men the unreviewable power to sentence women to
childbearing and childraising against their will is to delegate a sweeping
and unaccountable authority over the lives of-others. Any such allocation
of roles would operate to the serious detriment of women as a class, given
the multitude of ways in which unwanted pregnancy and unwanted chil-
dren burden the participation of women as equals in society. Even a
woman who is not pregnant would inevitably be affected by her
knowledge of the power relations thereby created.
Tribe, supra note 249, at 40-41 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Kenneth Karst observes, "Only a lawyer (a male lawyer) could regard
laws [regulating pregnancy, abortion, and contraception] as sex-neutral." Karst, supra
note 222, at 57 n.320.
24 Fundamentalist Protestant and Mormon opposition to abortion is based on be-
lief in the biblically ordained status of women as subordinate to men. The patriarchal
family is the model for all human relations, with God in command of the universe and
men in command of the home. The wife must submit to the husband's leadership "and
help him fulfill God's will for his life." Children must obey teachers, workers obey
employers and citizens obey civil authority. "The lines then descent and converge upon
the 'total family'-father first, then mother, then children. The organization chart is
entitled 'God's chain of command."' FitzGerald, A Reporter At Large: A Disciplined
Charging Army, NEw YORKER, May 18, 1981, at 74.
""' For a discussion of this technology, see supra notes 32 & 245.
[Vol. 132:955
RETHINKING SEX
laws governing reproductive biology and laws that classify explicitly on
the basis of sex and then recognize that laws governing reproductive
biology raise serious concerns about sex equality and therefore must be
justified by compelling state interests if they perpetuate the inequality
of women. This standard will now be applied to a number of state
policies that raise concerns about sex-based equality but that would
probably be subject only to minimum scrutiny under the current,
flawed equality doctrine. Consider the following:
1. To protect the health of pregnant women, state policy requires
that they quit public employment in the sixth month of pregnancy.
258
2. To protect the health of future children, state policy prohibits
the employment of women of childbearing age in positions in which
they may be exposed to substances that may be damaging to fetuses or
future reproductive capacity.
2 57
3. To limit the cost of employee disability insurance, benefits for
disabilities arising from normal pregnancy are excluded.2 58
4. a) Recognizing the physical burdens that pregnancy imposes
upon women, a state requires that employers allow pregnant workers
reasonable absences from work for medical disabilities associated with
pregnancy.
259
b) Recognizing the special nutritional needs of pregnant
women, the government provides supplemental food benefits for
them.28 o
5. a) The state allows up to six months of maternity leave at half
pay to women employees who are nursing infants.
b) The state allows all mothers, but not fathers, six months of
child care leave at half pay, whether or not they are nursing.
6. In an effort to provide a social counterbalance to men's rela-
tively minor role in reproduction and to encourage male involvement
with young children, the state requires that a pregnant woman inform
the man who impregnated her of the fact of pregnancy, unless she has
reasonable grounds to believe that he would physically abuse her if he
were informed.
256 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The Supreme
Court's decision in LaFleur is discussed supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
257 See generally Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconcili-
ation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEo.
L.J. 641, 641-43 (1981).
258 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 482 (1974). The Supreme Court's decision in
Geduldig is discussed supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
259 See Miller-Wohl Co. v. Counissioner of Labor and Indus., 515 F. Supp.
1264 (D. Mont. 1981) (upholding similar rule against equal protection challenge).
260 This is the WIC program described supra note 185.
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The first three examples describe laws that govern reproductive
biology and therefore are subject to scrutiny under the proposed stan-
dard. A requirement that women quit work once they reach the sixth
month of pregnancy reflects a stereotype of incompetence that is most
often inaccurate. This policy is similar to the rule that the Supreme
Court struck down in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur261 as
an "irrebuttable presumption. '26 2 The sex-equality analysis at the core
of my proposed standard is, however, a stronger way of assessing the
policy than the analysis that has grown out of the Court's limited un-
derstanding of sex equality. The law barring women from jobs that
involve exposure to teratagenic chemicals stereotypes women as child-
bearers, a stereotype that is inaccurate in relation to the many women
who cannot or intentionally do not bear children. The third example,
which excludes payments for pregnancy-related disabilities from insur-
ance plans, reflects a stereotype of women as temporary visitors to wage
labor whose contributions are insignificant and for whom job continuity
is unimportant.
Having determined that each of the three policies has a substantial
impact upon perpetuating sex-role stereotypes, each policy must be
strictly scrutinized. It is clear that alternative, sex-neutral means are
available to promote any of the legitimate goals that the state might
hope to serve by enforcing these rules. For example, a concern that
workers be physically fit can be served by a more individualized ap-
proach that encompasses non-pregnancy-related disabilities and that
recognizes that many pregnant women are not disabled. Professor
Wendy Williams has outlined in comprehensive detail some of the ways
in which a state might limit the destructive effects of teratagenic chemi-
cals while minimizing the damage to women's equality as wage work-
ers. 283 There are many ways to limit the costs of employee disability
261 414 U.s. 632 (1974).
262 Id. at 644.
263 See Williams, supra note 257. Williams discusses the tension between two
strong societal interests-equal employment opportunities for women and protection of
the future children of workers. Some employers currently protect future children by
barring all women between the ages of 18 and 50 from certain jobs deemed hazardous
unless the women can prove infertility. Since approximately two-thirds of all women
workers fall within this category, the burden is quite high in light of the goals of Title
VII to eliminate sex discrimination in employment including discrimination related to
pregnancy. Also teratogenic substances most likely have mutagenic effects as well,
which can be transmitted through sperm. Therefore merely excluding women from ex-
posure may not be the most appropriate method of protecting fetal health. There may
actually be discriminatory motives in these employment policies, especially since
"[w]omen have been excluded more often from traditionally male-intensive jobs than
[from] female-intensive jobs, even when exposures are similar." Id. at 649 (footnote
omitted).
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programs without imposing the burdens exclusively on pregnant
women.
The fourth example postulates a pair of laws, one requiring em-
ployers to allow pregnant workers reasonable absences from work
without losing their jobs and the other providing special nutritional
benefits to pregnant women. This type of law presents a closer case.
When Montana adopted a law requiring that leave from work be al-
lowed for pregnant women, feminists were divided in their views about
whether it should be regarded as sex discriminatory. 2 " For more than
a decade, the federal government has administered the Supplemental
Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIG), a program
that provides nutritional benefits to pregnant women.265
These two laws plainly govern reproductive biology. Whether they
have a substantial impact upon perpetuating inequality is less clear.
Such laws do not perpetuate cultural sex role stereotypes because they
are tied precisely to the biological fact of pregnancy. A law providing
help to pregnant women does not oppress women in a obvious way.
The law requiring reasonable leave for pregnant women is dangerous,
however, because the employer may decide to avoid the burden of pro-
viding the required protection by simply not hiring women who might
become pregnant. Whether that danger is sufficiently real to enable one
to conclude that the protective law oppresses women should, I believe,
be treated as a question of fact and judgment, not as a matter of ideo-
logical preconception. It is possible that evidence would substantiate the
fear that a mandatory leave rule would limit women's job
opportunities.
Many issues are relevant to the assessment whether such a law
oppresses women or whether it is supported by compelling state pur-
Williams rejects two possible options for resolving the tension: allowing employers
a free hand to express their concern over fetal well-being in any way they choose or
giving the woman employee an absolute right to choose the risks to which she will
expose her fetus. Instead, an appropriate balance of both interests must be reached. To
begin with, the policy must "[look] to the broad spectrum of ways in which exposures
of men and women can affect fetal health." Id. at 665. The assumption that the woman
worker is the proper target for exclusion must be rejected. "Rather, the presumption
should be that all workers may be subject to the reproductive hazards that could result
in birth defects and that the exclusion solely of women workers is unwarranted unless
or until the contrary is shown." Id. Any valid policy, therefore, must be gender neutral.
If after appropriate investigation, a substance is found only to affect the fetus through
exposure of the mother, 'then only women need be excluded. The burden however
would be on the employer to show that female exposure is the only risk, that no less
discriminatory alternative was available, and that the restriction was narrowly drawn.
Id. at 667.
2" See, e.g., Williams, supra note 199, at 194-200 (describing the Montana law
and the feminist reactions to it).
265 42 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V 1981); see supra note 185.
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poses. For example, can we foresee concrete ways in which the measure
providing help to pregnant women can be used to hurt them? This
inquiry distinguishes the WIC program from laws providing
mandatory leaves for pregnant women, for it is difficult to see how the
WIC program hurts women. Is the benefit provided so trivial that its
primary function is to reinforce stereotypical ideas about men and
women?28 At the other extreme, is the protection mandated for preg-
nant women so substantial that it is likely that those required to pro-
vide it would avoid dealing with women in order to escape it? For ex-
ample, a law demanding that employers provide pregnant workers four
months leave with pay would very likely have an adverse effect on
women's employment opportunities. It is, however, difficult to imagine
facts that would support a conclusion that the law providing nutritional
benefits to pregnant women enforces cultural stereotypes or is oppres-
sive. In either case, if a court concluded that the law in fact had a
substantial impact in perpetuating inequality, the law would have to be
struck down. The state could employ alternative, sex-neutral means of
achieving its objective of protecting against dismissal for health-related
absences or of ensuring a nutritionally adequate diet.
To understand fully the difficult issue posed by these two laws, it
is useful to examine the feminist opposition to them. One objection to
such laws, with which I fully agree, is that they are politically divisive.
"Creating special privileges of the Montana type [example 4(a)] has, as
one consequence, the effect of shifting attention away from the . . .
state's failure to provide important protections to all workers and focus-
ing it upon the unfairness of protecting one class of worker and not
others."2 ' In developing a political strategy for the less affluent major-
ity, it is vitally important to frame issues in ways that unite rather than
divide people.268 But the political reality is that it is often easier to
persuade a legislature to help or protect a particular group that is
smaller than all who might need the help or protection.
A second feminist objection to laws providing special protections
and benefits to pregnant women rests on a view of equality that says
that "[c]onceptualizing pregnancy as a special case permits unfavorable
266 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), though not involving a law governing
reproductive biology, illustrates the problem. There, the Court upheld a Florida law
affording women a maximum tax benefit of $15 per year to compensate them for dis-
crimination in the job market. Taub observes that this "crude brand of compensation
they purport to offer women is both inadequate and a distraction from the real
problems women face." Taub, supra note 197, at 1692.
267 Williams, supra note 199, at 196.
28 See, e.g., Sparer, Gordian Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for
the Poor Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 (1981).
[Vol. 132:955
RETHINKING SEX
as well as favorable treatment of pregnancy. ' 269 This argument has
tremendous power, given our present constitutional equality doctrine
that persistently confuses reproductive biology with cultural patterns
and that wholly denies the applicability of equality norms to laws gov-
erning reproductive biology. But this is not necessary as a matter of
nature or logic. Rather we could, as I have urged here, develop a con-
cept of equality that distinguishes between reproductive biological dif-
ference and cultural generalizations and that prohibits regulation of re-
productive biology whenever it oppresses women or reinforces cultural
sex-role stereotypes.
A final feminists' objection to such laws rests on an understanding
of our history in which biological difference has been used to justify a
separate role and world for women. Less than a century ago "doctors
and scientists were generally of the view that a woman's intellect, her
capacity for education, for reasoning, for public undertakings, was bio-
logically limited. '270 This history demands profound skepticism of rules
based on the fact that men and women are biologically different, but
does it require that we reject any recognition of sex-based biological
difference? Acknowledging the reality and importance of the reproduc-
tive biological difference does not necessarily set us on a slippery slope
on which the state is allowed to exaggerate the costs of difference. Rec-
ognizing that men and women are different in relation to reproductive
biology does not necessarily mean that the law can assume that we are
different in relation to capacity to think, to lead, or to nurture. It is
likely that courts would be less inclined to confuse biology with the
social consequences of biology if a finding that a law was premised on
biological differences between men and women were only the beginning
and not the end of the equality inquiry. Confronting the myth and real-
ity of biological differences may enable us to create a stronger equality
concept in relation both to laws premised on cultural stereotypes and to
laws that regulate reproductive biology.
The fifth example given above presents problems in relation to
maternity and paternity leaves to care for young children. The policy
providing child care leave to nursing mothers is one governing repro-
ductive biology. Does the policy have a substantial impact in perpetuat-
ing inequality? It seems that it does. Either parent, or a stranger, is
biologically capable of caring for a child. Limiting the childrearing to
nursing women reinforces the cultural expectation that "the paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices
269 Williams, supra note 199, at 196.
270 Id. at 199 (and sources cited therein). See also R. RoSENBERG, BEYOND SEPA-
RATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL RooT OF MODERN FEMINISM (1982).
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of wife and mother. 21 71 Such a policy would have to be struck down
because it could not withstand strict scrutiny; the state's interest in pro-
moting the physical or psychic benefits of nursing is not sufficiently
substantial to justify the burden upon men and women who would
choose to take child care leave but who cannot nurse. Also, the oppres-
sive effect upon women who would prefer not to nurse but are com-
pelled to do so in order to qualify for the leave is not justified by the
state's interest.
The second law presented in example 5 allows child care leave for
mothers but not for fathers. This is not a law that governs reproductive
biology but is instead a simple sex-based classification. A law based on
what the government perceives to be the ability and willingness of cer-
tain citizens to care for children is not a law governing reproductive
biology. A general maternal child care leave policy would be prohibited
under the ERA and would need to be justified under the Craig stan-
dard as having a close relation to important government interests. The
general maternal preference law would not be justifiable even under
the more relaxed requirements of the Craig standard if challenged by a
father who was able and eager to care for his child.
The final case, a statute requiring that a pregnant woman notify
the man who impregnated her of the fact of the pregnancy, can be seen
as a law governing reproductive biology. It addresses a problem of vital
social importance-the law lends practical and symbolic force to the
idea that men, as well as women, are responsible for the children they
create and attempts to mitigate the effects of men's relatively minor role
in relation to reproduction.
The hypothetical policy is far more sensitive to equality concerns
than consent and notification requirements that are triggered by a
woman's decision to have an abortion-requirements that have in the
past been held unconstitutional.2 72 The hypothetical law directs the
271 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).
272 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976), held that the
state may not give a husband the right to veto a woman's decision to abort. In
Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.
1981), the district court struck down a state law prohibiting physicians from perform-
ing abortions for married women unless the husband was given prior notice. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that even though the requirement burdened the woman's ac-
cess to abortion, it was supported by a compelling state interest in "maintaining and
promoting the marital relationship; and protecting a husband's interest in the procrea-
tive potential of the marriage." 659 F.2d at 483.
Having children is a major purpose of the institution of marriage .... If
proper abortion procedures have the potential to affect adversely a
woman's future procreative ability, the state may require notice to the
husband of the abortion, and hence of the possible impact on the mar-
riage's child-bearing capacity, whether or not he is the father of the fetus.
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woman to provide the information, rather than imposing the require-
ment on a physician. 73 It excuses notification when she has reason to
fear violence. It gives the man only information, not a formal right of
veto. Most significantly, it is not directed solely to women who seek
abortions. A requirement that men be notified only when the pregnant
woman seeks an abortion powerfully reinforces the cultural stereotype
that motherhood is women's destiny. A man's concrete emotional,
moral, and financial interest is vastly greater when a pregnancy he has
helped to create is carried to term than when it ends in abortion. Abor-
tion-only consent and notification policies express disapprobation for
abortion, regard the woman as a "mother-machine," and are indefen-
sible as a neutral means of increasing male involvement with reproduc-
tive decision-making.
But even this more sensitive notification requirement is oppressive
to women. The biological reality that "it is the woman who physically
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected
by the pregnancy"27 4 must preclude the state from giving the man
power over her decision whether to abort or to carry the pregnancy to
term. A requirement of notification, as opposed to a formal veto, has
effect only in those situations where the woman determines that com-
munication with the man is unwise.1
7 5
A man's interest in a pregnancy he has helped to create is undeni-
ably great. But a man's interest in having children does not justify im-
posing the burden of pregnancy and motherhood on a particular
woman. Even if that woman is his wife, the burdens of pregnancy,
which the woman inescapably bears, are too great to allow the man to
Id. at 486-87. On remand, the district court found that, as a matter of fact, abortion
does not have any adverse effect on woman's procreational potential. See 550 F. Supp.
1112, 1116-23 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
M The abortion-only consent and notification requirements have been directed to
physicians. They reflect contempt for the woman as a law abiding citizen and impose
burdens on physicians that exacerbate the shortage, and in many areas total unavaila-
bility, of doctors willing to perform abortions. In 1980, 78% of all U.S. counties had no
identified providers of abortion services. Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion
Services in the United States, 1979 and 1980, 14 FAM. PLAN. PEasp. 5 (1982).
274 428 U.S. at 71.
15 Apart from the risk of physical violence, which the hypothetical statute ad-
dresses, a woman may have a variety of legitimate reasons for deciding that it is unwise
to communicate information about pregnancy to the father. For example, the man may
be physically or mentally ill and incapable of coping. Or the woman may decide that
because of limited financial resources and obligations to other children she should have
an abortion, which the man would reject for reasons of religious principle. The woman
in this situation might reasonably believe that her choice to abort would damage her
valued relationship with the man. Or the woman might believe that the man would
subject her to coercive pressures other than physical violence. The possibilities are
endless.
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impose them upon her. A man's interest in terminating a pregnancy he
has helped to create may also be very great. He may be emotionally
and financially incapable of assuming responsibility for a child. Per-
haps society should allow biological parents greater freedom to reject
the rights and responsibilities of parenthood.2 76 There is a strong public
interest in encouraging fathers to be more involved in the nurturing and
care of their children. The notification requirement may promote this
interest. While this case is, for me, a difficult one, I do not believe that
even this sensitive notification policy could survive the strict scrutiny
that is appropriate to an analysis of laws that oppress women through
the regulation of reproductive biology. We do not now require that
mothers notify fathers at the point of birth and a multitude of public
policies limit, rather than enhance, the father's participation in the nur-
turing of children.
But parents' responsibilities to their children are not a function of
reproductive biology. Such responsibilities can and should be defined in
sex-neutral terms.
VI. THE FUTURE OF SEX-BASED EQUALITY UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE ERA
The Supreme Court's doctrine of sex-based equality under the
fourteenth amendment is exceedingly unstable. This instability is mani-
fest in the sharp divisions in analysis and result in cases such as
Parham v. Hughes,27  Caban v. Mohammed, 7
8 Lehr v. Robertson,2 79
and Michael M. v. Superior Court.2 s8 The core principles of the
Court's equality doctrine-the requirement that men and women be
treated as individuals rather than stereotypes and the recognition that
laws based on stereotypical assumptions are self-fulfilling as well as
inaccurate in particular cases-are inconsistent with the approach that
various members of the Court have taken in these cases. An unstable
present necessarily implies an uncertain future.
The fourteenth amendment guarantees equal treatment under the
law and recognition of the injustice of denying men and women oppor-
tunities solely on the basis of sex is broad and deep. It would be possi-
ble to achieve greater strength and stability in sexual equality doctrine
27" As a practical matter, parents of healthy young children have no difficulty
forfeiting parental rights and responsibilities and shifting those responsibilities to adop-
tive parents.
277 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
278 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
279 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
280 450 U.S. 464 (1981). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 126-82.
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through the approach advocated here, which focuses directly on the re-
ality and myth of biological differences. The Court could draw a sharp
distinction between laws creating sex-based classifications and laws reg-
ulating sex-specific physical characteristics and still recognize that laws
regulating sex-specific physical characteristics implicate the core con-
cerns of sex-based equality.
For the most part the argument advanced here builds upon equal-
ity and privacy doctrine. Courts are skilled at the manipulation of doc-
trine. When doctrine develops quickly, in response to large changes in
consciousness, modification in the light of experience and insight seems
particularly appropriate. The analysis in cases such as Michael M.,
Parham, and Caban is not so compelling, nor the results so clear, that
their approach need determine the way in which the Court analyzes
future cases raising issues different than those resolved there. Other
cases, notably Geduldig, are not so easily confined through the manipu-
lation of doctrine. The Court should simply overrule Geduldig, recog-
nizing it as the false step that Congress, nearly every commentator, and
the Court itself have regarded it.""1
The Equal Rights Amendment has been defeated, but it is certain
to rise again. What is not so certain is whether we will continue to
regard laws regulating reproductive biology as tangential to the consti-
tutional guarantee of sex-based equality. The direction in which the
Court will move under the fourteenth amendment and the vision of sex-
based equality reflected in the next ERA depend in large part upon the
vision of equality adopted by those who shape claims of sex-based
equality and reproductive freedom under existing constitutional guar-
antees and those who fight for the new ERA.
The ideas developed here are simply one woman's thoughts about
the meaning of sex equality, under either the fourteenth amendment or
the ERA. Although I support the Equal Rights Amendment, its major
congressional proponents and the leaders of the struggle to enact it have
81 See supra notes 106-10. Under the equality analysis presented here, policies
excluding payment for abortion for the otherwise comprehensive Medicaid program are
laws governing reproductive biology that plainly oppress women and are not supported
by important state interests. Whether the Supreme Court's decisions in Harris v. Mc-
Rae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), are therefore
wrong also depends upon whether we are persuaded by the Court's assertion that the
government doesn't do anything when it withholds public funds. See 448 U.S. at 316-
18. (denying funding for abortion leaves the poor woman in the same situation she
would be in "if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all"). For a
powerful critique of this assertion see Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly
Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32
STAN. L. REv. 1113 (1980).
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expressed a different vision of sex-based equality.28 2 Strong reasons,
both political and conceptual, support separation of doctrines of sex
equality and reproductive freedom. The political reality is that extreme
conservative religious and political groups have made opposition to
abortion an organizing issue-a sine qua non political test.28 3 Although
there is wide political support for equal pay for equal work and the
claims of individual aspirational women seeking access to traditional
male power, women's claims for control of their bodies present a more
profound challenge to prevailing structures of male dominance, and are
less widely accepted. Conceptual support for the separation of sex-
based equality and reproductive freedom rests on skepticism whether
courts are able to implement, with good faith and good sense, a concept
of sex equality that recognizes the reality of biological difference..2 4
Further, privacy doctrine is richly developed in relation to reproductive
freedom, and a shift to sex equality analysis in these cases seems, to
many, unlikely.28 5
282 See supra notes 72, 114 & 115; U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: GUARANTEEING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION (1981) (explaining and supporting the ERA without mentioning
abortion or pregnancy). In the contemporary ERA debate, Sen. DeConcini (D. Ariz.),
for example, states,
I strongly support and am a co-sponsor of the Equal Rights Amendment.
I also strongly support pro-life legislation, and have done so throughout
my career in the Senate. In my mind, there is no connection whatsoever
between the ERA and abortion. I further believe that no such connection
could or should be made here.
Even if the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, reverses itself on the use of
the privacy doctrine to permit abortion, I do not believe the ERA would or
should serve as a substitute rationale.
I, and I suspect a number of other colleagues who are also in the pro-
ERA, pro-life category-and there are close to a dozen of us in the Sen-
ate-would have great difficulty supporting the ERA if we felt that it
could be interpreted by a future court to give assistance in any degree to
forces that have a pro-choice attitude towards life or death of the unborn.
The Inpact of the Equal Rights Amendment upon Abortion Rights: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 65 (1984).
283 See F. JAFFEE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, supra note 116, at 165-79.
24 See, e.g., Taub, supra note 197. Taub argues that even a government financed
program targeting special benefits to pregnant women is unconstitutional because "the
effect of the scheme would be to reinforce the notion for women and men that child-
bearing is woman's primary function and that pregnancy is an illness meriting special
protection." Id. at 1693. Taub argues against an equality standard that would incorpo-
rate recognition of unique sex-based characteristics, asking, "How, then, can we go to a
male-dominated court system and ask for a fair accommodation of women's unique
requirements?" Id. at 1691.
28I Professor Ann Freedman, co-author of the ERA Article, see supra note 4, and
spokesperson for a coalition of groups supporting the ERA, explains,
I believe the issue of abortion is not germane to Congressional consid-
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Nonetheless, as this Article has attempted to demonstrate, a strong
concept of sex-based equality will require that we come to grips with
the reality of sex-based biological differences, either through the ap-
proach proposed here or in some other way. A political struggle that
embraces recognition that men and women are both limited by biology
and able to transcend it may be stronger than one that ignores the core
reality of sex difference in relation to reproductive biology.
Are we locked into the road we have taken? Are the two lines of
constitutional doctrine-reproductive freedom and sex-based equal-
ity-which began as a unified whole to preserve male dominance and
diverged in the early 1970's, now on fixed projections that move ineluc-
tably further apart? I think not. The law is a social creation that pro-
duced the legal structure that made biology destiny and enforced the
subjugation of women. In the 1970's we began the divergent movements
to create a different social construct of sex equality and reproductive
freedom. We can, if we choose, move toward a more unified under-
eration of the ERA, which should be promptly adopted on its own merits
and should not be used as an occasion for a debate about the merits of the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning the constitutional right to privacy.
[T]he ERA does not have a practical effect, in my opinion, on consti-
tutional decisionmaking about abortion.
[This is] because of the Supreme Court's well demonstrated commit-
ment to an alternative form of constitutional analysis, the constitutional
right to privacy.
There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court will abandon
privacy analysis and adopt a new form of constitutional analysis based on
the ERA. On the contrary, there are powerful reasons to believe that the
Court will continue to adhere to privacy analysis on the issue of abortion.
Thus, if the Supreme Court in the future wished to invalidate abor-
tion funding restrictions, it is my opinion that they would do so under the
constitutional right to privacy and not in reliance on the ERA.
[RIestrictions on abortion choice are subject to strict constitutional
scrutiny under the constitutional right to privacy. Under the ERA, preg-
nancy-related laws would be subject to strict scrutiny. This is the same
standard.
Were the Court to consider changing its mode of analysis from pri-
vacy to ERA and review abortion laws as pregnancy regulations, the stan-
dard of review would thus be the same as that already required under the
constitutional right to privacy. Because both doctrines mandate the same
level of scrutiny, there is no reason to expect the Court to switch its form
of analysis or to reach different results if it were to do so.
The Court adhered to its holding concerning the use of strict scrutiny
to review governmental restrictions on abortion choice in [Harris v. Mc-
Rae], while at the same time upholding the government's power to struc-
ture medical assistance funding to favor childbirth over abortion.
The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment upon Abortion Rights: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-8 (1984) (testimony of Ann Freedman).
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standing of the ways in which the law perpetuates sex-based restraints
on human equality and liberty.
